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ABSTRACT
We use an equilibrium unemployment framework to characterize the optimal unemployment insurance
(UI) over the business cycle. We investigate how the classical trade-off between insurance and incentives
to search evolves over the business cycle. In a broad class of models the trade-off is resolved by a
formula that expresses optimal UI as a function of not only usual statistics—risk aversion and micro-elasticity
of unemployment with respect to UI—but also a macro-elasticity that captures the general-equilibrium
effect of UI on unemployment. In a model with job rationing the formula implies that optimal UI is
countercyclical. In recessions jobs are rationed. Therefore the social value of search is low: aggregate
search efforts cannot reduce unemployment much; and individual search efforts create a negative externality
by reducing the job-finding rate of other jobseekers as in a rat race. Hence the trade-off tilts towards
insurance in recessions. To quantify the cyclical variations of optimal UI, we calibrate and simulate
a model with job rationing in which workers insure themselves partially using home production. Optimal
UI increases significantly in recessions. This result holds whether the government adjusts the level
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When risk-averse workers cannot insure themselves against unemployment and the search efforts
of jobseekers cannot be monitored, the government faces a trade-off between providing insur-
ance against unemployment and providing incentives to search for a job. Most models that study
this trade-off assume that unemployment depends solely on individual search efforts [Baily, 1978;
Chetty, 2006a; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Shavell and Weiss, 1979]. Yet the reality is more
complex. During the Great Depression, unemployed workers queued for jobs at factory gates. In
a queue, a jobseeker does increase his job-ﬁnding probability by searching more and pushing his
way up the queue; but those in front of him in the queue fall behind and face a lower job-ﬁnding
probability because the number of jobs available is limited. In the aggregate, unemployment de-
pends not only on individual search efforts but also on the number of workers that ﬁrms choose
to hire. Moreover the relationship between search efforts and unemployment evolves over the
business cycle because ﬁrms are more reluctant to hire workers in recessions than in expansions.
By modeling how unemployed workers search for jobs and how ﬁrms hire workers, one can un-
derstand more rigorously and more generally how the trade-off between insurance and incentives
evolves over the business cycle. In this paper, we adopt the equilibrium unemployment frame-
work of Pissarides [2000] to analyze the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) over the business
cycle. The framework offers an appealing description of the labor market: unemployed workers
receive beneﬁts funded by a labor tax whose incidence falls on workers; when workers become
unemployed, they decide how much to search for a job based on the generosity of UI; ﬁrms decide
how many vacancies to post based on the state of the economy; not all workers ﬁnd a job because
frictions impede matching of jobseekers with vacancies.
Our analysis rests on a new representation of the labor market equilibrium in a labor supply-
labor demand diagram. Because search costs are sunk when a worker and a ﬁrm meet, a surplus
arises from their match. Any wage sharing the surplus could be an equilibrium wage. Hence
wages cannot equalize labor supply to labor demand. Instead labor market tightness—the ratio of
vacancies to aggregate search effort—equalizes supply and demand. This property allows us to
represent the equilibrium in a labor supply-labor demand diagram in which labor market tightness
acts as a price, as depicted in Figure 1(a). The representation is quite general. If labor demand
1is perfectly elastic, unemployment depends solely on search efforts as in Baily [1978] and Chetty
[2006a]. At the polar opposite if labor demand is perfectly inelastic, unemployment is completely
independent of search efforts as in a rat race. These two special cases are depicted in Figure 1(b).
We begin in Section 2 by deriving a formula for the optimal replacement rate—the generosity of
unemployed beneﬁts as a fraction of the income of employed workers— in a static equilibrium un-
employment model. The formula, expressed in sufﬁcient statistics, does not require much structure
on the primitives of the model. As in the Baily [1978]-Chetty [2006a] formula, a ﬁrst term captures
the trade-off between the need for insurance, measured by a coefﬁcient of risk aversion, and the
need for incentives to search, measured by an elasticity of unemployment with respect to UI. But
we replace the micro-elasticity used in the Baily-Chetty formula by a macro-elasticity to measure
the budgetary costs of UI in an equilibrium unemployment framework. The micro-elasticity em is
the elasticity of the probability of unemployment for a worker whose individual beneﬁts change,
and the macro-elasticity eM is the elasticity of aggregate unemployment when beneﬁts changes
for all workers. Formally em takes labor market tightness as given, whereas eM accounts for the
equilibrium adjustment in tightness following a change in UI. Moreover our formula adds to the
Baily-Chetty formula a second term proportional to the wedge em=eM  1. This wedge captures
the welfare effects of the employment change arising from the equilibrium adjustment in tightness
after a change in UI. At the end of Section 2, we extend the formula to a model in which workers
partially insure themselves against unemployment, and to a model in which wages respond to UI.
In Section 3, we characterize the optimal replacement rate over the business cycle by applying
our formula to the equilibrium unemployment model of Michaillat [2012]. The model captures
two critical elements of the business cycle: (a) unemployment ﬂuctuations, and (b) job rationing—
the property that the labor market does not converge to full employment in recessions even when
searcheffortsarearbitrarilylarge. Feature(a)arisesfromtechnologyshocksandrealwagerigidity.
Feature (b) arises from the combination of wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor.
Because of feature (a), the model accommodates periods of high unemployment and periods of
low unemployment. Because of feature (b), the model is consistent with the fact that unemployed
workers queue for jobs in recessions.1
1Michaillat [2012] shows that standard models of equilibrium unemployment do not have job rationing. These
models always converge to full employment when job-search efforts are arbitrarily large, even in recessions.
2We ﬁrst prove that the macro-elasticity is lower than the micro-elasticity, creating a wedge
em=eM  1 > 0. The wedge arises because when the number of jobs available is limited, searching
more to increase one’s probability of ﬁnding a job mechanically decreases others’ probability of
ﬁnding one of the few jobs available. Because of this wedge, our formula calls for a higher re-
placement rate than the Baily-Chetty formula. As jobseekers search taking the job-ﬁnding rate as
given, without internalizing their inﬂuence on the job-ﬁnding rate of others, they impose a negative
rat-race externality. A higher replacement rate corrects the externality by discouraging job search.
Next, we prove that the wedge em=eM  1 is countercyclical and the macro-elasticity eM pro-
cyclical. Recessions are periods of acute job shortage during which job search and matching
frictions have little inﬂuence on labor market outcomes. The search efforts of jobseekers have
little inﬂuence on aggregate unemployment and the rat-race externality is exacerbated. Thus the
macro-elasticity is small and the wedge between micro-elasticity and macro-elasticity is large.
Finally, we use our formula to prove that the optimal replacement rate is countercyclical. In
recessions the macro-elasticity eM falls. A higher UI only increases unemployment negligibly.
Hence the marginal budgetary cost of UI is small. In recessions the wedge em=eM  1, which
measures the welfare cost of the rat-race externality, increases. Hence the marginal beneﬁt of UI
from correcting the externality is high.2 At the end of Section 3, we show that optimal UI is also
countercyclical in a model in which aggregate demand shocks drive ﬂuctuations, and in a model in
which the government provides a wage subsidy to employers to attenuate employment ﬂuctuations.
In Section 4 we calibrate and simulate a dynamic model to quantify the cyclical ﬂuctuations
of optimal UI. Workers insure themselves partially against unemployment using home production.
When the government balances its budget each period and unemployment beneﬁts never expire,
the optimal replacement rate is strongly countercyclical: it increases from 50% when the unem-
ployment rate is 4% to 70% when the unemployment rate reaches 10%. When the government can
borrow and save, the government provides higher consumption to all workers in recessions and
the optimal replacement rate increases more sharply after an adverse shock. When the government
2In this paper we analyze how the classical trade-off between insurance and incentives to search evolves over the
business cycle. Additional mechanisms could justify raising UI in recessions. For instance, if unemployed workers
were more likely to exhaust their precautionarysavings in recessions, the consumption-smoothing beneﬁts of UI would
increase and it would be optimal to raise UI further [Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2011].
3adjusts the duration of unemployment beneﬁts, as in the US, the optimal duration is strongly coun-
tercyclical: it increases from less than 10 weeks when unemployment is 4%; to 26 weeks when
unemployment is 5.9%; and to over 100 weeks when unemployment reaches 8%.
The property that em=eM > 1 distinguishes our model from standard models of equilibrium
unemployment: em=eM < 1 in the canonical model with Nash bargaining; and em=eM = 1 if bar-
gaining is replaced by rigid wages. In Section 5, we discuss empirical evidence by Cr´ epon et al.
[2012] that em=eM > 1, in support of our model. We also discuss how em and eM can be estimated
to implement our UI formula. Proofs, derivations, and extensions are collected in the Appendix.
2 Formula for Optimal Unemployment Insurance
In this section we use a static model of equilibrium unemployment to derive a formula expressing
the optimal level of UI in terms of sufﬁcient statistics: curvature of the utility function, micro- and
macro-elasticity of unemployment with respect to UI. We also propose two extensions of the for-
mula. Oneaccounts forthe ability ofworkers to insurethemselves partially againstunemployment.
The other accounts for the response of wages to UI, through bargaining or labor tax incidence.
2.1 The static model
Labor market. There is a unit mass of workers. Initially, u 2 (0;1) workers are unemployed
and search for a job with effort e, while 1 u workers are employed. Firms post o vacancies
to recruit unemployed workers. The number of matches h made is given by a constant-returns
matching function h = h(eu;o) of aggregate search effort eu and vacancies o, differentiable and
increasing in both arguments, with the restriction that h(eu;o)  minfu;og. Conditions on the
labor market are summarized by labor market tightness q  o=(eu). A jobseeker ﬁnds a job at a
rate f(q)  h(eu;o)=(eu) = h(1;q) per unit of search effort; a jobseeker searching with effort
e ﬁnds a job with probability e f(q). A vacancy is ﬁlled with probability q(q)  h(eu;o)=o =
h(1=q;1). When q is high, it is easy for jobseekers to ﬁnd jobs—f(q) is high—and difﬁcult for
ﬁrms to hire—q(q) is low. To capture the inﬂuence of tightness on these probabilities, we deﬁne
the tightness elasticities of f(q) and q(q): 1 h  q f0(q)=f(q) > 0 and  h  qq0(q)=q(q) < 0.
4A fraction e f(q) of the u unemployed workers ﬁnds a job during matching. The h = ue f(q)
new hires join 1 u incumbents in ﬁrms and the employment level after matching is
n(e;q) = (1 u)+ue f(q): (1)
Employment n(e;q) increases mechanically with effort e and tightness q, as f() is increasing.
Workers. A worker’s utility is v(c) k(e), where v() is an increasing and concave function of
consumption c and k() is an increasing and convex function of effort e. The curvature of the utility
functions is measured by r   cev00(ce)=v0(ce), the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion evaluated
at ce, and k  ek00(e)=k0(e), the elasticity of the marginal disutility of effort. Firms pay a wage
w. To ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts bw the government imposes a labor tax t. As in the public
ﬁnance literature we assume that the incidence of the tax is entirely on the worker’s side. We
also abstract from possible bargaining effects. Hence the wage w responds neither to the beneﬁt
rate b not to the tax rate t. Workers neither borrow nor save, so consumption is ce = w(1 t)
when employed and cu = bw when unemployed. Let Dc  ce  cu and Dv  v(ce) v(cu) be
the consumption and utility gains from work. Given labor market tightness q and consumptions
fce;cug, a jobseeker chooses effort e to maximize expected utility
v(cu)+e f(q)Dv k(e):
The optimal effort is a function e(q;Dv) implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition
k0(e) = f(q)Dv: (2)
As the disutility k() from effort is convex and the job-ﬁnding rate f() is increasing, the optimal
effort e(q;Dv) increases with tightness q and with the utility gain from work Dv.
5Budget constraint. Since the government ﬁnances unemployment beneﬁts with a labor tax, its
budget constraint is (1 n)bw = nt w. In terms of consumptions the constraint is
nce+(1 n)cu = nw: (3)
As in optimal income tax theory we consider that the government chooses the consumption gain
from work Dc, which determines cu = n(w Dc) and ce = cu+Dc through the budget constraint.
Equilibrium. The equilibrium is parameterized by Dc, which characterizes the generosity of
UI. It is useful to represent the equilibrium in a labor demand-labor supply framework. Let
es(q;Dc)  e(q;Dv(Dc)) be the effort supply. The labor supply ns(q;Dc)  n(es(q;Dc);q) gives
the employment rate after matching when jobseekers search optimally for a given labor market
tightness q. It increases with q because both es(q;Dc) and n(e;q) increase with q. It is concave
in q if and only if (1 h)(1+k)=k < 1.3 Let nd(q) summarize the ﬁrm’s demand for labor as a
function of q. In presence of matching frictions the equilibrium wage cannot equalize labor supply
to labor demand. Instead, q acts as a price equilibrating labor supply and labor demand:
ns(q;Dc) = nd(q): (4)
This equilibrium condition is represented in Figure 1(a). Equilibrium employment n(Dc) is given
by the intersection of the upward-sloping labor supply curve ns(q;Dc) with a generic downward-
sloping labor demand curve nd(q). Tightness q equalizes supply and demand. If labor supply is
above labor demand, a reduction in q increases labor demand; it reduces labor supply by reducing
the job-ﬁnding rate as well as optimal search effort; until labor supply and labor demand are
equalized. In Section 3, we impose more structure and derive a downward-sloping labor demand.
Our framework is quite general. It nests the Baily-Chetty model as a special case. In the Baily-
Chetty model, employment is solely driven by search efforts. It is a partial-equilibrium model of
unemployment in the sense that it ﬁxes labor market tightness q and job-ﬁnding rate f(q). As
showed in Figure 1(b), the Baily-Chetty model can be represented with a perfectly elastic labor
3Lemma A3 in the Appendix proves the concavity of the labor supply. If jobseekers exert a constant search effort
irrespective of labor market tightness (k = +¥), then the labor supply is concave for any parameter values.
6demand, which determines q independently of UI. At the polar opposite, our framework also nests
the rat-race model as a special case. In the rat-race model, the number of jobs is ﬁxed. As showed
in Figure 1(b), the rat-race mode can be represented with a perfectly inelastic labor demand, which
determines n independently of UI.
Government. The government chooses the consumption gain from work Dc to maximize welfare
nv(ce)+[1 n]v(cu) uk(e): (5)
Equilibrium effort e and equilibrium employment n are read off the effort supply and labor supply
curves: e = es(q;Dc), n = ns(q;Dc), where equilibrium tightness q satisﬁes condition (4). Con-
sumptions ce and cu satisfy the government’s budget constraint (3) and ce = cu+Dc.
2.2 Elasticities and optimal unemployment insurance formula
To solve the government’s problem we need to characterize the individual response of jobseekers
(through a change in effort) and the aggregate response of the labor market (through the response
of both jobseekers and ﬁrms) to a change in UI. To this end, we deﬁne two elasticities:


























































If labor demand is perfectly elastic, q is determined by ﬁrms independently of UI and eM = em.
Both elasticities are normalized to be positive and are depicted for various models in Fig-
ure 1(c)–1(f). The micro-elasticity measures the percentage increase in unemployment 1 n when

















































































































































































































(f) Elasticities in model with Nash bargaining
Figure 1: Labor market equilibria in a price q-quantity n diagram
8search effort e but ignoring the equilibrium adjustment of labor market tightness q. It can be es-
timated by measuring the reduction in the job-ﬁnding probability of an individual unemployed
worker whose unemployment beneﬁts are increased, keeping the beneﬁts of all other workers con-
stant. The macro-elasticity measures the percentage increase in unemployment when the net re-
ward from work decreases by 1%, assuming that both search effort and tightness adjust. It can be
estimated by measuring the increase in aggregate unemployment following a general increase in
unemployment beneﬁts.
The two elasticities differ in models of equilibrium unemployment as long as labor demand
is not perfectly elastic. A rat-race model illustrates the difference. u jobseekers queue in front
of o < u vacant jobs. Workers searching more move up the queue and increase their probability
of ﬁnding a job. Formally, the unconditional probability n to be employed after the matching
process increases with search effort e: n(e; f) = (1 u)+ue f, where f is the equilibrium job-
ﬁnding rate. Searching harder increases the employment probability n, so the micro-elasticity em
is positive. But when a jobseeker moves up the queue by searching more, the jobseekers in front of
him in the queue fall behind and face a lower probability of ﬁnding a job. Formally, the equilibrium
job-ﬁnding rate f = o=(ue) falls when aggregate search effort e rises to equilibrate labor supply
n(e; f) with the ﬁxed labor demand 1 u+o. As a result of the job shortage, the macro-elasticity
eM is smaller than the micro-elasticity em. In fact equilibrium employment n = 1 u+o < 1 is
ﬁxed, independent of aggregate search effort. Therefore eM = 0 even though em > 0.
To solve the government’s problem we use the envelope theorem as workers choose effort e













where ¯ v0  nv0(ce)+(1 n)v0(cu) denotes the average marginal utility.
We now provide some intuition for (8), and we explain how (8) can be expressed in terms of
sufﬁcient statistics. Consider a small increase dDc > 0 in the consumption gain from work—
equivalent to a cut in unemployment beneﬁts. The ﬁrst term in (8) captures the utility gain of
4To apply the envelope theorem, note that social welfare (5) is (1 u)v(ce)+u[v(cu)+e f(q)Dv k(e)].
9the n employed workers, whose consumption ce = cu +Dc increases by dDc: dS1 = nv0(ce)
dDc. To satisfy the budget constraint, increasing Dc requires cutting unemployment beneﬁts cu =
n(w Dc), which reduces by dcu the consumption of all workers, including the employed as
ce = cu +Dc. The second term in (8) captures the associated utility loss dS2 =  ¯ v0 dcu. Since
dcu =  ndDc+(w Dc)dn =  

n (1 n)[(w Dc)=Dc]eM	




dDc. The macro-elasticity eM appears in dS2 to capture the
budgetary cost of the increase in unemployment caused by higher UI.
The job-ﬁnding rate f(q) depends on labor market tightness q, which is determined in equi-
librium by (4) as the intersection of labor demand and labor supply as depicted in Figure 1. The
change dDc > 0 increases the incentive to search, shifts labor supply ns(q;Dc) outwards, and leads
to a small equilibrium adjustment dq of labor market tightness. The change dq in turn leads to
a small change dnq in employment through two channels: (a) a change (¶n=¶e)(¶es=¶q)dq
in employment through a reduction in search effort—this reduction, however, does not have any
welfare effect by the envelope theorem as workers choose effort to maximize expected utility; and
(b) a change (¶n=¶q)dq in employment through a change in job-ﬁnding rate f(q). Each new job
created through (b) generates a ﬁrst-order utility gain Dv > 0 as ﬁnding a job discretely increases
consumption. The third term in (8) captures the welfare change from the equilibrium adjustment
dq. Lemma 1 establishes the relationship between the change (¶n=¶q)dq in employment, which
is the only relevant change from a welfare perspective, and the wedge em eM:




































Using the lemma we rewrite dS3 Dv(¶n=¶q)dq=Dv[k=(1+k)][(1 n)=Dc][eM em]
dDc. At the optimum the sum dS1+dS2+dS3 is zero, allowing to rewrite (8) as follows.






















































If labor demand is perfectly elastic, em =eM, the second term in the right-hand side of (9) and (10)
vanishes, and the formulas reduce to those in Baily [1978] and Chetty [2006a].
The proposition provides a formula for the optimal replacement rate, deﬁned as the amount
transferred to unemployed workers expressed as a fraction of the income of employed workers.
The replacement rate measures the generosity of the UI system. Equation (9) provides an exact
formula while equation (10) provides a simpler formula using the approximation method of Chetty
[2006a]. The approximated formula (10) is expressed in sufﬁcient statistics, which means that
the formula is robust to changes in the primitives of the model. Indeed the formula is valid for
any utility over consumption with coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion r; any marginal disutility of
effort with elasticity k and associated micro-elasticity em; any labor demand, function only of labor
market tightness and an exogenous shock, yielding a macro-elasticity eM; and any constant-returns
matching function. Since the four statistics are estimable, the formula can be used to assess the
current UI system.5 Admittedly the statistics are endogenous functions of the replacement rate, so
we cannot infer directly the optimal replacement rate from estimates of the statistics. Nevertheless,
we can infer that increasing the replacement rate t is desirable if the current t=(1 t) is lower than
the right-hand side of formula (10) evaluated using current estimates of the four statistics.
The ﬁrst term in the optimal replacement rate (10) increases with the coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion r, which measures the value of insurance. If micro- and macro-elasticity are equal
(em = eM), our formulas reduce to the Baily-Chetty formula. For instance the approximated for-
5Section 5 discusses how to estimate micro- and macro-elasticity. Appendix E.4 explains how to estimate k from
the micro-elasticity of the hazard rate out of unemployment with respect to beneﬁts estimated by Meyer [1990]. Many
studies estimate the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion [for example, Chetty, 2006b].
11mula (10) becomes t=(1 t)  (r=em)(1 t). In the formula the trade-off between the need
for insurance (captured by the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion r) and the need for incentives
to search (captured by the micro-elasticity em) appears transparently. In a model of equilibrium
unemployment micro- and macro-elasticity generally differ (em 6= eM), and our formula presents
two departures from the Baily-Chetty formula.
The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of formulas (9) and (10) involves the macro-elasticity eM
and not the micro-elasticity em, conventionally used to calibrate optimal beneﬁts [Chetty, 2008;
Gruber, 1997]. What matters for the government is the budgetary cost of UI from higher aggregate
unemployment and higher outlays of unemployment beneﬁts, and only eM captures this cost in an
equilibrium unemployment framework. The optimal replacement rate naturally decreases with eM.
A second term, increasing with the ratio em=eM, also appears in the right-hand side of formu-
las (9) and (10) when em 6= eM. The term is a correction that accounts for the ﬁrst-order welfare
effects of the adjustment of employment that arises from the equilibrium adjustment of labor mar-
ket tightness after a change in UI. Even in the absence of any concern for insurance—if workers
are risk neutral—some unemployment insurance should be provided as long as the correction term
is positive (em=eM > 1).
2.3 Extensions
Self-insurance. Weextendthemodeltoincludepartialself-insurancebyworkers. Chetty[2006a]
shows that the Baily formula carries over to models with savings, borrowing constraints, private
insurance, or leisure beneﬁts of unemployment. Similarly, formulas (9) and (10) carry over with
minor modiﬁcations. Introducing self-insurance through borrowing and saving would require a
dynamic model. Instead, we consider the simpler case of self-insurance through home produc-
tion. In addition to unemployment beneﬁts cu received from the government, unemployed workers
consume an amount y of good produced at home at a utility cost m(y), increasing, convex, and
normalized so that m(0) = 0. Jobseekers choose effort e and home production y to maximize
[1 e f(q)][v(cu+y) m(y)]+[e f(q)]v(ce) k(e):
12Home production y is chosen so that v0(cu +y) = m0(y). It provides additional insurance that is
partially crowded out by UI, as y decreases with cu. The government chooses Dc to maximize
nv(ce)+[1 n][v(cu+y) m(y)] uk(e);
where e and y are chosen optimally by individuals, subject to the same constraints as in our orig-
inal problem. Let ch  cu +y be the total consumption when unemployed and Dvh  v(ce) 

































Clearly, formula (9) carries over by replacing v0(cu) by v0(ch) and Dv by Dvh.




of UI is smaller if individuals can partially self-insure using home production,
because ch  cu. The welfare effect of the equilibrium adjustment of q is also smaller because
maxy[v(cu+y) m(y)]  v(cu) so Dvh = v(ce) [v(cu+y) m(y)]  Dv = v(ce) v(cu). If work-
ers can partially smooth consumption on their own, the optimal replacement rate t is lower than in
our original model without self-insurance. As shown in Section 4.2, the extended formula can be
implemented using estimates of the consumption-smoothing beneﬁt of UI from Gruber [1997].
Wage response to UI. In the baseline model we assume that wages paid by ﬁrms do not respond
to UI . But UI may affect the outside options of workers and inﬂuence the wage through bargaining.
Or the incidence of the labor tax ﬁnancing UI may fall partly on employers. In this section we show
that formula (9) carries over with a minor modiﬁcation when wages depend on UI.
As UI is parameterized by the consumption gain from work Dc, we assume that the wage is a
function w(Dc). In that case, a change dDc in the generosity of UI affects the government budget’s
constraint not only through a change dn in employment, but also through a change dw in wages.





































13A new term appears on the right-hand side of the formula. The term is negative if dw=dDc < 0, as
lower beneﬁts reduce the outside option of workers and the UI payroll tax leading to lower wages
through both bargaining and employer tax incidence channels. At the same time when wages
respond to UI in that way, the macro-elasticity eM is likely to be higher than in our basic model
because higher beneﬁts increase wages, depress labor demand, which increases unemployment
further. Overall optimal UI is likely to be lower, despite the additional negative term.6
3 Unemployment Insurance in Presence of Job Rationing
In this section we specialize the model to obtain the properties that unemployment is high and jobs
are rationed in recessions—periods of low technology. We use formula (9) to prove that optimal
UI is countercyclical. At the end of the section we show that the result is quite general. It holds
in a model in which aggregate demand, instead of technology, drives ﬂuctuations. It also holds in
a model in which the government provides, in addition to UI, a wage subsidy to ﬁrms to attenuate
unemployment ﬂuctuations. We provide intuitions with the equilibrium diagram of Figure 1.
3.1 Firms
The representative ﬁrm takes labor n as input to produce a consumption good according to the
production function ag(n) = ana. a > 0 measures marginal returns to labor. a > 0 is the level
of technology, which proxies for the position in the business cycle.
ASSUMPTION 1. The production function has diminishing marginal returns to labor: a < 1.
The assumption yields a downward-sloping labor demand curve in a price q-quantity n diagram,
which has important macroeconomic implications. The assumption is motivated by the observation
that, at business cycle frequency, some production inputs are slow to adjust.
Wages are set once worker and ﬁrm have matched. Since the costs of search are sunk at the time
of matching, a surplus arise from each worker-ﬁrm match. Any wage sharing this surplus could
6In Appendix B we assume that a fraction y of the tax burden falls on ﬁrms and a fraction 1 y falls on workers.
The wage w becomes an increasing function of the labor tax rate t. We apply the formula in that case and obtain a
formula similar to (9), except that each of the three terms in (9) is corrected with the incidence parameter y.
14be an equilibrium wage [Hall, 2005]. Given the indeterminacy of wages we use the simple wage
schedule of Blanchard and Gal´ ı [2010]:
ASSUMPTION 2. The wage schedule is rigid: w = wag, g < 1.
w is a parameter. The parameter g captures the rigidity of wages over the business cycle. If
g = 0, wages do not respond to technology and are completely ﬁxed over the cycle. If g = 1, wages
are proportional to technology and are fully ﬂexible over the cycle. We assume that wages are
rigid in the sense that (a) they only partially adjust to a change in technology, and (b) they do
not respond to a change in UI. Rigidity (a) generates unemployment ﬂuctuations over the cycle
[Hall, 2005]. Rigidity (b) makes labor demand independent of UI and allows us to focus on the
classical trade-off between insurance and incentive to search. Both assumptions are empirically
grounded. Many historical, ethnographic, and empirical studies document and explain wage rigid-
ity [for example, Bewley, 1999; Jacoby, 1984; Kramarz, 2001]. Empirical studies consistently ﬁnd
that re-employment wages do not respond to changes in unemployment beneﬁts [Card et al., 2007].
As in Pissarides [2000], it costs r a to post a vacancy. The parameter r > 0 measures the
resources spent on recruiting. We assume away randomness at the ﬁrm level: a worker is hired
with certainty by opening 1=q(q) vacancies and spending ra=q(q). When the labor market is
tighter, a ﬁrm posts more vacancies to ﬁll a job, and recruiting is more costly.
The ﬁrm takes prices as given. It starts with 1 u workers. Given labor market tightness q,














Under Assumption 1, g0() decreases with n. q() decreases with q. Thus labor demand nd(q;a)
decreases with q. When the labor market is tight, it is expensive for ﬁrms to recruit, depressing
7We assume that technology is high enough such that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to choose positive hiring: h =
n (1 u) > 0. The assumption requires a > (w=a)(1 u)
(1 a)=(1 g).
15labor demand. Under Assumption 2, w=a decreases with a so nd(q;a) increases with a. When
technology is high, wages are relatively low, stimulating labor demand.
The equilibrium in the labor market is depicted in Figure 1 in a price q-quantity n plan. The
ﬁgure plots labor demand curves for high and low technology (panel (c) and panel (d)). It plots
labor supply for low and high consumption gains from work Dc (dotted line and solid line). Jobs
are rationed in recessions in the sense that the labor market does not clear and some unemployment
remains even as unemployed workers exert an arbitrarily large search effort. The mechanism
creating a job shortage is quite simple. After a negative technology shock the marginal product of
labor falls but rigid wages adjust downwards only partially, so that the labor demand shifts inward
(from panel (c) to panel (d)). If the adverse shock is sufﬁciently large, the marginal product of
the least productive workers falls below the wage. It becomes unproﬁtable for ﬁrms to hire these
workers even if recruiting is costless at q = 0: labor demand cuts the x-axis at nR < 1 on the right
panel. Even if workers searched inﬁnitely hard, shifting labor supply outwards such that q ! 0,
ﬁrms would never hire more than nR < 1 workers: there is a job shortage. When the shortage is
acute in recessions, the social returns to search are small because an increase in search efforts only
leads to a negligible increase in employment.
3.2 Elasticity wedge
Formula (9) adds to the Baily-Chetty formula a second term proportional to the wedge em=eM  1.
Proposition 2 establishes that em=eM > 1 in our model with job rationing in which wages are rigid
(Assumption 2) and the labor demand is downward sloping (Assumption 1):






where c  a(1 a)[(1 h)=h][(1+k)=k](1=r). Under Assumption 1, em=eM > 1.
Proposition 2, combined with formula 9, justiﬁes public provision of UI. If em=eM > 1, small
private insurers would underprovide UI because they maximize proﬁts by using the Baily-Chetty
16formula to determine how much insurance to provide to their clients. Small insurers solely take
into account the micro-elasticity of unemployment, and do not internalize search externalities. In
that case, the government would improve welfare by complementing the private provision of UI.
To understand why the micro-elasticity em is larger than the macro-elasticity eM, consider the
cut in unemployment beneﬁts dDc > 0 depicted in Figure 1(c). The change creates variations in
all variables dDc, dn, dq, and de, so that all equilibrium conditions continue to be satisﬁed. The
change in effort can be decomposed as de = deDc+deq, where deDc = (¶es=¶Dc)dDc is a partial-
equilibrium variation in response to the change in UI, and deq is a general-equilibrium adjustment
following the change dq in labor market tightness. Using the labor supply equation (1) we have
dn=dne+dnq where dne =(¶n=¶e)deDc and dnq =[¶n=¶q+(¶n=¶e)(¶es=¶q)]dq. Following
a cut in beneﬁts an individual jobseeker increases his search effort, increasing his own probability
of ﬁnding a job by dne > 0. From the jobseeker’s perspective, labor market tightness q remains
constant. The interval A–C in Figure 1(c) represents dne. When the jobseeker ﬁnds a job, how-
ever, he reduces the proﬁtability of the marginal jobs left vacant because (a) the productivity of
these jobs falls by diminishing returns to labor, and (b) the prevailing wage does not adjust to the
drop in marginal productivity . Thus the ﬁrm reduces the number of vacancies posted to ﬁll these
less proﬁtable jobs. Labor market tightness falls by dq < 0, reducing the job-ﬁnding rate f(q) of
jobseekers who are still unemployed. dnq < 0 is the corresponding reduction in employment, rep-
resented by interval C–B in Figure 1(c). As a consequence the equilibrium increase in employment
dn following an increase in aggregate search efforts is smaller than the increase dne in the individ-
ual probability to ﬁnd a job following an increase in individual search efforts. The interval A–B in
Figure 1(c) represents dn < dne. The difference between micro-effect dne and macro-effect dn is
dnq < 0. Equation (7) says that eM = em+[Dc=(1 n)]dnq=dDc. Since dnq < 0, eM < em.
3.3 Optimal replacement rate
Our previous results do not require any assumptions on the functional forms of the utility functions
and matching function. They only involve the local elasticities h, r, and k. But to characterize the
cyclicality of the micro-elasticity, the macro-elasticity, and the optimal replacement rate, we must
control how the local elasticities ﬂuctuate over the business cycle:
17ASSUMPTION 3. The utility functions are isoelastic: v(c)=ln(c), k(e)=wke1+k=(1+k). The
matching function is Cobb-Douglas: h(eu;o) = wh(eu)
ho1 h.
The parameters wk >0 and wh >0 measure the cost of search and the effectiveness of matching.
To determine how the elasticities and the optimal replacement rate vary over the business cycle,
we must also specify the initial unemployment u associated with each technology level a:
ASSUMPTION 4. For any a, u is such that in equilibrium h = n (1 u) = sn, s 2 (0;1).
The equilibrium is determined given initial unemployment u and technology a. Assumption 4
ensures that in equilibrium, the fraction h=n of new hires in the workforce remains constant over
the cycle. The assumption replicates in our static model a feature of dynamic equilibrium unem-
ployment models that assumes a constant job-destruction rate s, independent of technology.8
Proposition 3 establishes that the wedge em=eM is countercyclical and the macro-elasticity eM
is procyclical in a model with job rationing in recessions (Assumptions 1 and 2):










   
t
> 0:
The proposition says that the macro-elasticity is large in expansions but small in recessions, as
illustrated by comparing Figure 1(c) to Figure 1(d). This is because in recessions, jobs are acutely
rationed and search efforts have little inﬂuence on aggregate unemployment. The proposition
also says that the wedge between micro- and macro-elasticity is small in expansions but large in
recessions. This is because when jobs are acutely rationed, searching more mechanically increases
one’s job-ﬁnding probability but it decreases others’ job-ﬁnding probability as in a rat race.
Proposition 4 establishes that the optimal replacement rate t is countercyclical in a model with
job rationing in recessions (Assumptions 1 and 2):
8Pissarides [2000] and many others assume a constant job-destruction rate s and balanced labor market ﬂows.
When ﬂows are balanced, ﬁrms hire each period as many workers as they lose. Therefore the fraction of new hires in
the workforce is constant over the cycle.
18PROPOSITION 4. Assume that formula (9) implicitly deﬁnes a unique function t(a) 2 (0;1),
continuous and differentiable. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, if n > 1=2 and (a=h)s(1 h)
(k+1)=k  1, then dt=da < 0.
The proposition says that the optimal replacement rate is more generous in recessions than in
expansions. The formal proof, relegated in the Appendix, exploits formula (9). But we can sketch
the proof informally using the approximated formula (10) and Proposition 3. In recessions the
macro-elasticity eM falls and the ﬁrst term in formula (10) increases. In recessions the marginal
budgetary cost of UI is small because a higher UI only increases unemployment negligibly. More-
over in recessions the wedge em=eM increases and the second term in formula (10) increases. The
wedge measures the welfare cost of a negative rat-race externality imposed by unemployed work-
ers on others. The externality arises because unemployed workers search taking the job-ﬁnding
rate as given, and do not internalize their inﬂuence on the job-ﬁnding rate of others. UI corrects
the externality by discouraging job search. In recessions the externality is acute so the marginal
beneﬁts of UI are high. Since both terms in formula (10) increase, t must increase.
The formal proof is more complex because n enters the exact formula (9). The results of Propo-
sition 3 are not sufﬁcient to prove the proposition. We need to prove that eM is sufﬁciently pro-
cyclical and that em=eM is sufﬁciently countercyclical to compensate the ﬂuctuations in n. To do
so, we need two additional assumptions. The assumption n > 1=2 is needed because if tech-
nology a is so low that most workers become unemployed, it becomes optimal to reduce the
replacement rate t. Suppose all workers are unemployed (n = 0; q = 0). Providing more con-
sumption to employed workers has no budgetary cost but it provides incentives for unemployed
workers to search more, which could raise employment. Clearly, it is optimal to reduce the gen-
erosity of UI. In fact Lemma A9 in the Appendix establishes that when a ! 0 then n ! 0 and
t ! 0. This result implies that for very low levels of technology and very low levels of employ-
ment, the optimal replacement rate is bound to increase with technology. The assumption that
(a=h)s(1 h)(k+1)=k  1 is needed to ensure that the labor supply is convex enough. As
shown by comparing Figures 1(c) and 1(d), the convexity of labor supply in the (n;q) plan drives
the cyclicality of elasticities. The assumption is easily satisﬁed for any reasonable calibration
because s, which captures the job-destruction rate, is very small. In the calibration in Table 1,
19(a=h)s(1 h)(k+1)=k = 0:008  1.
3.4 Relation to the Hosios [1990] condition
To relate our work to the classical efﬁciency result in Hosios [1990], we conﬁne the analysis to
the canonical model of equilibrium unemployment.9 The canonical model is characterized by two
assumptions that replace Assumptions 1 and 2 in the model with job rationing:10
ASSUMPTION 5. The production function has constant marginal returns to labor: a = 1.
ASSUMPTION 6. The wage w is determined using the generalized Nash solution to the bargain-
ing problem faced by ﬁrm-worker pairs. The bargaining power of workers is b 2 (0;1).
































Equilibriumlabormarkettightnessq, determinedby(12), doesnotdependontechnologya. There-
fore, keeping the replacement rate t constant, there are no ﬂuctuations in tightness over the busi-
ness cycle.11 As tightness is strongly procyclical in the data, the Nash bargaining solution cannot
account for the labor market ﬂuctuations observed over the business cycle.
To make our analysis comparable to the efﬁciency result in Hosios [1990], we assume that
the government assigns a welfare weight equals to the average marginal consumption utility v0 to
proﬁts, as if ﬁrm ownership was equally distributed. We then extend formula (9) to a class of model
9The results presented in this section are derived formally in Appendix C.
10See Pissarides [2000] for a complete treatment of the canonical model of equilibrium unemployment.
11Blanchard and Gal´ ı [2010] and others have proved similar theoretical results in a variety of settings.
20in which Assumption 5 holds and the wage is a function w(Dc) of the consumption gain from work




































The valuation of proﬁts and the response of wages appear simply as a multiplicative correction
to the externality term of formula (9).12 We can apply the formula to the canonical model. If
workers are risk neutral and the bargaining power matches the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to effort (b = h), the optimal replacement rate implied by the formula is t = 0. Risk
neutrality implies that the ﬁrst term in the right-hand-side numerator is zero. With b = h and t = 0
the bargained wage is w = h=(1 h)(ra)=q(q) = Dv, so the second term in the right-hand-side
numerator is zero. Therefore, our formula conforms to the Hosios [1990] condition for efﬁciency.
3.5 Robustness
Aggregate demand shocks. A limitation that the model shares with most equilibrium unem-
ployment models is that business cycles are generated by technology shocks only. This is not
plausible. For instance, aggregate demand shocks likely contribute to labor market ﬂuctuations.
To study optimal UI in a demand-generated business cycle, Appendix F.1 builds a basic model in
which recessions are driven by aggregate demand shocks ampliﬁed by nominal wage rigidity.
Jobs are rationed in this model as well, albeit through a different mechanism. Firms face a
downward-sloping aggregate demand curve in the goods market. The larger the quantity produced
by workers, the lower the market price for goods. When aggregate demand is low enough, the
production of workers would sell at a price below the nominal wage if all workers were employed.
In this situation, ﬁrms would not hire all workers in the labor force even if recruiting were costless.
Some unemployment would remain if jobseekers searched inﬁnitely hard.
We represent the labor market equilibrium with our labor supply-labor demand diagram in Fig-
12In this class of models, proﬁts are p = (1 u)(ra)=q(q) and wages are w = a (ra)=q(q). Therefore the
response of p and w to a change in UI solely depend on the response of labor market tightness q. Since the response
of q to a change in UI is captured by the externality term, the response of p and w only enters as a multiplicative
correction to the externality term in the formula.
21ure A1 in the Appendix. The labor supply is the same, and the labor demand retains the same
properties, as in the model of technology-generated business cycle. The labor demand curve is
downward sloping in a price q–quantity n plan because higher employment n implies more pro-
duction, lower prices in the goods market, higher real wages because of nominal wage rigidity, and
requires a lower tightness q for ﬁrms to be willing to hire. When aggregate demand falls, prices
fall and real wages rise, so the labor demand shifts inwards.
Given the similarity of the structures of the labor market equilibrium in the two models, it
comes as no surprise that all the results derived in the model with technology-generated business
cycle also apply in the model with demand-generated business cycles. We prove that the results
on the cyclicality of the wedge em=eM and the macro-elasticity eM (Proposition 3), as well as the
cyclicality of the optimal replacement rate (Proposition 4) remain valid once derivatives are taken
with respect to aggregate demand instead of technology. Hence, the generosity of the optimal UI
also increases in recessions caused by low aggregate demand.13
Wage subsidies. Because of real wage rigidity, wages are high relative to technology in reces-
sions, which raises unemployment. The government cannot correct wages under our assumption
that the incidence of a labor tax is fully on workers. While the assumption is standard in public
ﬁnance and justiﬁed in the long run, the wage rigidity observed in micro-data suggests that chang-
ing the payroll tax imposed on employers is likely to change the wages effectively paid by ﬁrms
in the short run. In this section we explain why our results remain valid when the government can
attenuate unemployment ﬂuctuations using wage subsidies. The formal proof is in Appendix D.
The government chooses a rate b of unemployment beneﬁts, a tax rate t imposed on the salary
w received by employees, and a subsidy rate s imposed on the salary w paid by employers.
Firms pay a wage w = (1 s)w, employed workers consume ce = (1 t)w, and unemployed
workers consume cu = bw. Equivalently, we consider that the government chooses directly
the wage w and consumptions ce, and cu. The government is subject to the budget constraint
13To showcase the range of applications of our framework, we entertain another possible source of business cycles
in Appendix F.2. We assume that business cycles are generated by a preference shock that affects workers’ disutility
from job search. In recessions it is unpleasant for unemployed workers to search. Jobseekers reduce their effort,
reducing labor supply and increasing unemployment. Simulations suggest that the optimal UI is procyclical in this
model. But the model is unrealistic: it has the counterfactual property that labor market tightness is countercyclical.
22(1 n)bw +nsw = t nw, but this constraint can be rewritten exactly as the baseline
budget constraint (3) that relates w, ce, and cu.
If the government could control wages at no cost using wage subsidies, it would be optimal to
eliminate unemployment ﬂuctuations and keep UI at a constant level. However, it is improbable
that the government could implement a wage subsidy at no cost. Various sources of cost come
to mind. First, informational frictions may require the government to collect vast amount of data
to devise a subsidy that would eliminate unemployment ﬂuctuations. Second, political constraints
may impose a cost on the government to enact the desired subsidy: for instance, trade unions may
resist the reduction of the cost of labor incurred by ﬁrms. Third, aggregate demand may be low
in recessions and ﬁrms may be constrained to sell a ﬁxed low quantity of goods. Reducing the
marginal cost of labor with a subsidy would not lead ﬁrms to hire workers in the short run; it
would only be a transfer from the government to ﬁrm owners. Since ﬁrm ownership is usually con-
centrated, the marginal propensity to consume of wealthy ﬁrm owners is much lower than that of
workers, and a subsidy could depress aggregate demand further. Formally, we represent these costs
as an increasing convex cost function C(s) included in the objective function of the government.
In that case, it is not optimal to eliminate entirely cyclical ﬂuctuations in unemployment because
of the cost C(s). Let w be the optimal wage chosen by the government given the cost of a subsidy.
Given w the government chooses Dc to maximize social welfare (5) subject to the budget con-
straint (3). This is exactly the problem faced by the government in the baseline model. There-
fore the optimal UI formula (9) remains valid. Let ˜ w  w=a be the optimal wage w normalized
by technology a. ˜ w is the only source of ﬂuctuations in the economy through the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-
maximization condition (11). Since the government cannot stabilize unemployment completely,
˜ w must ﬂuctuate. Once we replace the derivatives with respect to a by derivatives with respect to
˜ w, the results on the cyclicality of the elasticities em and eM (Proposition 3) and the result on the
cyclicality of the optimal replacement rate (Proposition 4) remain valid. The sign of the deriva-
tives naturally changes because an increase in ˜ w has the same effect as a decrease in a: it raises
unemployment and reduces labor market tightness.
To conclude, the properties of optimal UI are robust to the presence of a wage subsidy that
attenuates unemployment ﬂuctuations. Wage subsidies may be a powerful tool to stimulate em-
23ployment in recessions. One could model the costs and beneﬁts of wage subsidies to design an
optimal wage subsidy over the business cycle that would complement our optimal UI.
4 Simulations
In this section we enrich the static model used for the theoretical analysis to make it more realistic:
the static model is cast into a dynamic environment; workers use home production to insure them-
selves partially against unemployment; and proﬁts enter the budget constraint of the government
to capture either ownership of ﬁrms by workers or direct taxation of proﬁts by the government. We
calibrate the model with US data and solve it numerically to quantify how optimal UI varies over
the business cycle. We study various institutional arrangements for the administration of UI that
could not be studied in a static environment, such as the adjustment of the duration of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and the recourse to deﬁcit spending in recessions.
4.1 The dynamic model
This section provides an overview of the dynamic model. The solution to the worker’s, ﬁrm’s, and
government’s problems, as well as the deﬁnition of the equilibrium are presented in Appendix E.
Technology follows a stochastic process fatg
+¥
t=0. The labor market is similar to that in the static
model. The only difference is that at the end of period t  1, a fraction s of the nt 1 existing
worker-job matches is exogenously destroyed. Workers who lose their job become unemployed,
and start searching for a new job at the beginning of period t. At the beginning of period t,
ut = 1 (1 s)nt 1 unemployed workers look for a job.
The government fully taxes proﬁts, taxes or subsidizes labor income, and provides unemployed
beneﬁts. Its budget must be balanced each period. It is as if, given technology fatg
+¥
t=0, the gov-
ernment directly chose consumption fcu
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E0 is the mathematical expectation conditioned on time-0 information, d<1 is the discount factor.
The representative ﬁrm is owned by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Given labor market tightness
and technology fqt;atg
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t 1  0 is the number of hires in period t.
Wages follow an exogenous process fwtg
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We calibrate all parameters of the model at a weekly frequency as shown in Table 1.14 We calibrate
as many parameters as possible directly from micro-evidence and macro-data for the US for the
December 2000–June 2010 period. Following Michaillat [2012] we set d = 0:999, s = 0:0094,
r = 0:32w. We use a Cobb-Douglas matching function h(u;o) = whuho1 h and set h = 0:7,
in line with empirical evidence [Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001]. We choose a coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion r = 1, on the low side of available estimates [Chetty, 2006b]. We calibrate
the wage ﬂexibility g based on estimates obtained in micro-data. It is mostly the ﬂexibility of
14This exercise is only illustrative of the magnitudes of the optimal policy, because our model abstracts from a
number of relevant issues and there remains considerable uncertainty about the calibration of some parameters, such
as the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion.
25wages in newly created jobs, not in existing jobs, that drives job creation. The best estimate of
this ﬂexibility using US data is provided by Haefke et al. [2008]. Using panel data following
production and supervisory workers over the 1984–2006 period, they estimate an elasticity of total
earnings of job movers with respect to productivity of 0.7. If the composition of jobs accepted by
workers improves in expansions, 0.7 is an upper bound on the elasticity of wages in newly created
jobs. A lower bound on this elasticity is the elasticity of wages in existing jobs, estimated in the
0.1–0.45 range with US data [Pissarides, 2009]. We set g = 0:5, in the range of plausible values.
We calibrate the remaining parameters by matching the steady-state value of the variables in
the model to the average of their empirical counterpart. We normalize average technology ˆ a = 1
and average effort ˆ e = 1. We compute average labor market tightness and unemployment using
seasonally-adjusted, monthly series for the vacancy level (collected by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS)) and the unemployment level
(computed by the BLS from the Current Population Survey (CPS)) over the 2000–2010 period. We
ﬁnd ˆ q = ˆ v=ˆ u = 0:47 and ˆ u = 5:9%, which implies ˆ n = 0:950. In the US, weekly unemployment
beneﬁts replace between 50% and 70% of the last weekly pre-tax earnings of a worker [Pavoni
and Violante, 2007]. Following Chetty [2008] we set the beneﬁt rate to 50%. Since earnings are
subject to a 7:65% payroll tax, we set the replacement rate to ˆ t = 0:5=(1 0:0765) = 54%.
To calibrate the matching efﬁciency wh we exploit the steady-state relationship ue f(q) =
sn=s(1 u)=(1 s). Weﬁndwh =s=(1 s)(1  ˆ u)=ˆ uˆ qh 1 =0:19. Wetargettheconventional
labor share of ˆ ls  ( ˆ w ˆ n)=ˆ y = 0:66. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (equation (A24) in




= 0:67. The condition also allows
us to recover w = 0:70, and r = 0:32w = 0:23.
We calibrate the parameters of the home-production cost function m(y) = wmy1+µ=(1+µ).15
As showed in Appendix E.4 the convexity µ is related to two statistics: e2 and x, that have been
estimated empirically. The ratio x  ch=ce = (cu+y)=ce captures the consumption drop upon un-
employment. The statistics e2 is the marginal consumption change dch=dcu, which captures the in-
15We introduce home production to model partial self-insurance by unemployed workers. If self-insurance arises
not only from home production but also from saving and borrowing, self-insurance may be less available in recessions,
for instance with savings depletion or credit market collapse. Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] ﬁnd, however, that the
consumption-smoothing beneﬁt of UI is acyclical, which suggests that self-insurance remains available in recessions.
Accordingly, we assume a stable home-production technology over the business cycle.
26crease in total consumption dch =dcu+dy>0 for an unemployed worker who receives a marginal




=fe =  0:068. As emphasized by Browning and Crossley [2001], however, total
consumption is more elastic than food to a change in income. Using the estimates of Hamermesh
[1982], we ﬁnd that the aggregate income elasticity of food consumption for unemployed workers
is 0:36, including both food consumed at home and away from home.16 Accordingly we expect







=0:36. Setting e2 = 0:27:=0:36 = 0:75
and x = 1 (0:068=0:36) = 0:81 imply µ = 1:01. In addition the resource constraint (13) yields
ˆ ch = 0:79 and ˆ y = 0:26. We set wm = 4:84 such that the worker’s optimal choice of home produc-
tion (equation (A27) in the Appendix) holds for ˆ ch and ˆ y.
We calibrate the parameters of the disutility from search k(e)=wke1+k=(1+k). Appendix E.4
shows that the convexity k is related to a statistics e1 that has been estimated empirically. The
statistics e1  (cu=x)(¶x=¶cu) captures the reduction in the hazard rate x  e f(q) out of un-
employment when an unemployed worker receives an increase dcu > 0 in beneﬁts, keeping labor
market tightness q constant. Meyer [1990] estimates e1 = 0:9, which yields k = 0:97. We also ob-
tain wk =0:58 to match ˆ e=1 with the worker’s optimal choice of effort (speciﬁed in Appendix E).
4.3 Optimal replacement rate
To describe how the optimal replace rate varies over the business cycle, we compare steady states
parameterized by different technology levels.17 The results are displayed in Figure 2. Panel (a)
gives the unemployment rate for the different steady states: unemployment is high in steady states
with low technology. Panel (b) is a Beveridge curve, which shows that labor market tightness
decreases with unemployment. Panel (c) ﬁnds that optimal UI is strongly countercyclical: the
optimal replacement rate increases from 51% to 71% when the unemployment rate increases from
16Hamermesh [1982] estimates that for unemployed workers the permanent-income elasticity of food consumption
at home is 0:24 while that of food consumption away from home is 0:82. He also ﬁnds that in the consumption basket
of an unemployed worker, the share of food consumption at home is 0.164 while that of food consumption away from
home is 0:041. Therefore the aggregate income elasticity of food consumption is 0:24[0:164=(0:164+0:41)]+
0:82[0:041=(0:164+0:41)] = 0:36.
17In steady state, technology remains constant over time: at = a for all t. The impulse response function of the
optimal replacement rate to a negative technology shock is presented in Figure 3 and discussed in Section 4.4.
27Table 1: Steady-state targets and parameter values used in simulations (weekly frequency)
Steady-state target Value Source
ˆ a Technology 1 Normalization
ˆ e Effort 1 Normalization
ˆ ls Labor share 0.66 Convention
ˆ u Unemployment 5.9% JOLTS, 2000–2010
ˆ q Labor market tightness 0.47 JOLTS, 2000–2010
t Replacement rate cu=ce 54% Pavoni and Violante [2007], Chetty [2008]
x Consumption drop ch=ce 81% Hamermesh [1982], Gruber [1997]
e2 Marginal consumption change dch=dcu 0.75 Hamermesh [1982], Gruber [1997]
e1 Elasticity of unemployment hazard rate 0.90 Meyer [1990]
Parameter Value Source
d Discount factor 0.999 Corresponds to 5% annually
r Relative risk aversion 1 Chetty [2006b]
h Effort-elasticity of matching 0.7 Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001]
g Real wage ﬂexibility 0.5 Pissarides [2009], Haefke et al. [2008]
r Recruiting cost 0.21 Barron et al. [1997], Silva and Toledo [2009]
s Separation rate 0.94% JOLTS, 2000–2010
wh Effectiveness of matching 0.19 Matches steady-state targets
a Marginal returns to labor 0.67 Matches steady-state targets
w Steady-state real wage 0.70 Matches steady-state targets
k Convexity of disutility of effort 0.97 Matches steady-state targets
wk Steady-state disutility of effort 0.58 Matches steady-state targets
wm Steady-state disutility of home production 4.84 Matches steady-state targets
µ Convexity of disutility of home production 1.01 Matches steady-state targets
4% to 10%. This result is critical because it conﬁrms that the result of Proposition 4 also holds
in a realistic calibrated model. Panel (c) shows that it is optimal to increase the consumption of
unemployed workers relative to that of employed workers in recessions. Panel (d) goes one step
further. It shows that it is optimal to increase the consumption of unemployed workers in absolute
terms in recessions. The gap between beneﬁts and the consumption of unemployed workers in
panel (d) corresponds to home production. Panel (e) shows that home production decreases in
recessions, when unemployment beneﬁts become more generous. Panel (f) shows that search
efforts decrease in recessions, when UI becomes more generous and the job-ﬁnding rate falls.
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Figure 2: Optimal unemployment insurance over the business cycle
Notes: The simulations, described in the Appendix, are based on the dynamic model calibrated in Table 1.
294.4 Alternative institutional arrangements
This section studies numerically various institutional arrangements for the administration of UI
that could not be studied in the static model, such as the adjustment of the duration of beneﬁts
(instead of their level), and deﬁcit spending (instead of budget balance).
Deﬁcit spending. In the baseline model, the government must balance its budget each period. It
cannot use deﬁcit spending to shift resources intertemporally from expansions to recessions and
smooth the consumption of workers. This assumption allows us to focus on the trade-off between
insurance and incentives within each period. But in practice the government is able to borrow and
save. In this section we assume that the government has access to a complete market for Arrow-
Debreu securities, in which it faces risk-neutral investors with discount factor d. An Arrow-Debreu
security pays one unit of consumption good after history at. Its price is dt  p(at), where p(at) is
the probability of history at based on time-0 information. The government trades securities at time















We solve the government’s problem by log-linearization in Appendix E.5. To obtain the co-
movements of technology with the optimal replacement rate in a stochastic environment, we com-
pute impulse response functions. Figure 3 depicts the responses to a negative technology shock
in two cases: the blue solid lines are responses in the baseline case in which the government is
constrained by (13) to balance his budget each period; and the red dashed lines are responses
when the government is subject to a single intertemporal budget constraint (14). Unemployment
responds similarly in both cases: it builds slowly and peaks after 20 weeks more than 10% above
its steady-state value. The response of the optimal replacement rate to an adverse economic shock
is qualitatively identical in both cases. But quantitatively the replacement rate increases by 5.6%
at the peak under budget balance, whereas it increases by 8.2% under deﬁcit spending. Under
budget balance the replacement rate increases because the level of beneﬁts increases by 4.4% and
the consumption of employed workers falls by 1.2%. This fall is necessary to ﬁnance more gen-
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−0.5%








































Figure 3: Impulse response of optimal unemployment insurance to a negative technology shock
Notes: The ﬁgure displays impulse response functions (IRFs), which represent the percentage-deviation from steady
state for each variable. We assume that the log-deviation of technology ˇ at  dln(at) follows an AR(1) process:
ˇ at+1 = n ˇ at +zt+1 where zt  N(0;s2) is an innovation to technology. Michaillat [2012] estimates the AR(1) process
using BLS data for 1964:Q1–2010:Q2 and ﬁnds n = 0:991 and s = 0:0026 at weekly frequency. IRFs are obtained by
imposing an unexpected negative technology shock z1 =  0:01 to the log-linear dynamic model. The blue solid IRFs
are responses of the optimal equilibrium when the government is constrained by (13) to balance its budget each period.
The red dashed IRFs are responses of the optimal equilibrium when the government is subject to a single intertemporal
budget constraint (14). Log-linear systems and computations are described in the Appendix.




































































Figure 4: Optimal duration of unemployment insurance over the business cycle
Notes: Panels obtained with the dynamic model in which unemployment beneﬁts have ﬁnite duration. The model is
calibrated according to Table 1. The Appendix describes the numerical simulations.
erous beneﬁts to a larger number of unemployed workers. Under deﬁcit spending the government
smoothes consumption of employed workers almost perfectly, and the beneﬁt level increases by
8.2%. As unemployed workers reduce home production when they receive more generous bene-
ﬁts, the consumption of unemployed workers does not increase as much as unemployment beneﬁts:
it increases only by 2.5% under budget balance and 4.5% under deﬁcit spending, because home
production falls by 2.4% under budget balance and 4.4% under deﬁcit spending. When the gov-
ernment is able to borrow and save, consumption of both employed and unemployed workers is
higher because the government provides additional consumption smoothing in recessions. The
budget deﬁcit—beneﬁt outlays minus tax revenue in the period—increases by 1.2% at the peak.
Duration of unemployment beneﬁts. In the baseline model, unemployed workers receive un-
employment beneﬁts independent of the length of their unemployment spell. The government
adjusts the level of the beneﬁts over the cycle. But in practice beneﬁts have ﬁnite duration, and
the government modulates the duration of beneﬁts over the cycle.18 In this section, we assume
18US unemployment beneﬁts have a maximum duration of 26 weeks in normal times. But under the Extended
Beneﬁts program, duration is automatically extended by 13 weeks in states where unemployment is above 6.5% and
by 20 weeks in states where unemployment is above 8%. Often duration is further extended by the government
in severe recessions. For example, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program enacted in 2008 extends
durations by an additional 53 weeks when state unemployment is above 8.5%.
32that unemployment beneﬁts have ﬁnite duration, which the government adjusts over the cycle.19
We follow Fredriksson and Holmlund [2001] and assume that eligible unemployed workers ex-
haust their unemployment beneﬁts cu
t with probability lt at the end of each period t. Ineligible
unemployed workers receive consumption ca
t < cu
t from social assistance until they ﬁnd a job.
The replacement rates tu;e = cu
t =ce
t of unemployment beneﬁts and ta;e = ca
t =ce
t of social as-
sistance are constant over time. The government chooses the rate lt at which eligible workers
become ineligible to maximize social welfare subject to a budget constraint similar to (13). We
solve the model numerically using the calibration in Table 1. We set the replacement rates at
tu;e = 0:65=(1 0:0765) = 70% and ta;e = 0:52tu;e = 36% such that an expected duration of 26
weeks is optimal when the unemployment rate is at its average level of 5:9%.20 The left panel in
Figure 4 shows how unemployment and its composition varies with technology. When technol-
ogy increases, total unemployment falls, the number of eligible jobseekers falls, but the number of
ineligible jobseekers increases because arrival rate of ineligibility increases drastically. The right
panel shows that the optimal arrival rate of ineligibility l is strongly procyclical. Accordingly
the optimal expected duration of unemployment beneﬁts 1=l is strongly countercyclical. When
unemployment is 4% the optimal arrival rate of ineligibility is 21%, corresponding to an expected
beneﬁts duration of less than 5 weeks. When unemployment reaches 5.9% the optimal arrival
rate falls to 3.9%, corresponding to an expected beneﬁts duration of 26 weeks. When unemploy-
ment reaches 7.0%, the optimal arrival rate drops to 2.0%, corresponding to an expected beneﬁts
duration of 50 weeks. The optimal arrival rate is virtually nil when unemployment is above 9%.
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section we present recent empirical evidence that supports our theoretical work. We also
discuss how the current UI system could be assessed using formula (10) and empirical estimates
19This section only provides an overview of the model, whose formal description and analysis is in Appendix E.6.
20We assume that when workers lose their entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts, social assistance provides food
stamps. Pavoni and Violante [2007] compute that the median monthly allotment of food stamps for a family of
four was $397 per month in 1996. They also ﬁnd that the median monthly wage for a worker with at most a high-
school diploma, eligible to welfare, is $1,540. Thus the rate of social assistance is 397=1;540 = 26%. As the rate of
unemployment beneﬁts is 50%, ta;e=tu;e = 0:26=0:5 = 0:52.
33of the micro-elasticity em and macro-elasticity eM.
Proposition 2 shows that the micro-elasticity is always greater than the macro-elasticity in our
model with job rationing (characterized by Assumptions 1 and 2): em=eM > 1. This result is a
testable implication that distinguishes our model from standard models of equilibrium unemploy-
ment. In the canonical model (characterized by Assumptions 5 and 6), em=eM < 1.21 Figure 1(f)
provides some intuition. When UI falls, jobseekers search more. The labor supply shifts outwards,
which increases employment by em. In addition when UI falls, jobseekers face a worse outside op-
tion. ThewageobtainedbyNashbargainingfalls, whichraiseslabordemandandequilibriumlabor
market tightness. Employment rises further, and the total increase in employment is measured by
eM. Clearly, eM > em. In the canonical model with rigid wages (characterized by Assumptions 5
and 2), em=eM = 1.22 This property is illustrated in Figure 1(e). It arises because labor demand is
perfectly elastic and independent of UI, such that equilibrium tightness is independent of UI.
To test the validity of these models, we need an empirical estimate of em=eM. Cr´ epon et al.
[2012] provide such an estimate by analyzing a large randomized ﬁeld experiment in France in
which some young educated jobseekers are treated by receiving job placement assistance. The
experiment has a double-randomization design: some areas are treated and some are not, and
within treated areas some jobseekers are treated and some are not. We interpret the treatment as
an increase in search effort from eC for control jobseekers to eT > eC for treated jobseekers. We
present the results for male workers. Compared to control jobseekers in the same area, treated
jobseekers face a higher job-ﬁnding probability:

eT  eC
 f(qT) = 11:3%. But compared to





=  3:9%. Therefore the increase in the job-ﬁnding probabil-





















These empirical results imply a wedge em=eM = 11:3=7:4 = 1:53. The wedge em=eM > 1 is evi-
dence of a negative rat-race externality: in the short run, treated jobseekers displace control job-
21Proposition A1 in the Appendix establishes the result formally under log utility.
22The property derives from Proposition 2 applied to the case a = 1.
23See Table 9, column 5 in Cr´ epon et al. [2012].
34seekers in queues for jobs. This compelling randomized experiment suggests that our model with
job rationing provides a good description of the labor market at business cycle frequency.24
Cr´ epon et al. [2012] ﬁnd additional evidence supporting our model. Consistent with Proposi-
tion 3 they ﬁnd that the wedge em=eM is larger when the labor market is more slack, in geographical
areas or time periods with higher unemployment. For example, the wedge is small in the years pre-
ceding the 2008–2009 recession: em=eM =11:1=(11:1 1:4)=1:14, while it is much larger during
the recession: em=eM = 11:0=(11:0 7:5) = 3:14.25
We can also use empirical estimates of em=eM and eM to implement formula (10) and assess
the UI system in the labor market of interest over the business cycle. The method of Cr´ epon et al.
[2012] could provide estimates of em=eM over the business cycle. The ideal experiment to estimate
eM is to offer higher unemployment beneﬁts to all individuals in a randomly selected subset of
labor markets and compare unemployment durations across treated and control labor markets. But
estimating the macro-elasticity eM is inherently more difﬁcult than estimating a micro-elasticity em
because it necessitates exogenous variations in beneﬁts across comparable labor markets, instead
of exogenous variations across comparable individuals within a single labor market.26
To circumvent the difﬁculty of directly estimating eM, one could combine estimates of em with
estimates of em=eM and recover estimates of eM. The ideal experiment to estimate em is to compare
individuals with different beneﬁts in the same labor market at a given time, while controlling for
individual characteristics. Two different methods have been recently designed to implement this
approach. Schmieder et al. [2012] use sharp variations in the potential duration of unemployment
beneﬁts by age in Germany, population-wide administrative data, and a regression discontinuity
method to identify the micro-elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the potential
duration of beneﬁt entitlement. Their estimates are broadly constant over the business cycle (Table
4, column 7).27 Landais [2012] exploits kinks in the level and duration schedules of unemployment
24In the long run bargaining effects may raise the macro-elasticity by raising wages. As long as such effects are
constant over the cycle, bargaining effects would affect the optimal level but not the optimal cyclicality of UI.
25See Table 10, Panel A, column 2 in Cr´ epon et al. [2012].
26Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] propose to estimate the macro-elasticity by using variations in average beneﬁts
within US states over time, controlling for state ﬁxed effects. With this method they ﬁnd that the elasticity of unem-
ployment duration with respect to beneﬁts is smaller when state unemployment is higher, consistent with the result of
Proposition 3 in presence of job rationing (Table 2, columns 1 and 2).
27Schmiederetal.[2012]estimatetheeffectofpotentialdurationonthedurationofbothcoveredunemploymentand
total non-employment. They ﬁnd that the elasticity of total non-employment is constant over the business cycle (Table
35beneﬁts to conduct a regression kink design. He uses administrative data from the Continuous
Wage and Beneﬁt History (CWBH) recording employment and unemployment histories for the
universe of workers in 5 US states from 1976 to 1983. He estimates the micro-elasticities of
paid unemployment and non-employment durations with respect to both beneﬁt level and potential
duration. He ﬁnds that micro-elasticities with respect to beneﬁt level and potential duration are
broadly constant over the business cycle (Tables 6 and 8).
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37Appendix — NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A Proofs
We begin by deriving a few preliminary results.





















Proof. The worker’s optimal choice of effort (2) gives k0(e) = f(q)Dv. Differentiating with















which yields the ﬁrst results. We obtain the second result by differentiating the optimal choice of
effort (2) with respect to Dv, keeping q ﬁxed.





























Proof. Obvious using Lemma A1 and equation (1): n(e;q) = (1 u)+ue f(q).
LEMMA A3. The labor supply ns(q;Dc) is concave in q if and only if (1 h)(1+k)=k < 1.






































38A.1 Proof of Lemma 1































































































































which is the ﬁrst result in the lemma. The second result in the lemma is obtained by combining the
ﬁrst result with the result of Lemma A2.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The government chooses Dc to maximize
(1 u)v(ce)+u[v(cu)+e f(q)Dv k(e)] = n(e;q)v(cu+Dc)+(1 n(e;q))v(cu) uk(e)
Using the envelope theorem (as workers choose search effort e to maximize v(cu)+e f(q)Dv 
























39where we deﬁne v0  [nv0(ce)+(1 n)v0(cu)].










































































































































































































































































A.3 Proof of Proposition 2









































































Since q > 0, h > 0, h 2 (0;1), k > 0: em=eM > 1 if and only if a 2 (0;1).
A.4 Some comparative statics
From now on, we focus on the case with log utility: v(c) = ln(c). In this case, Dv = ln(1=t), and
it becomes natural to parameterize the equilibrium with (a;t) instead of (a;Dc). a captures the
position of the economy in the business cycle and t captures the generosity of UI. This parame-
terization is convenient because when t remains constant, the supply curve remains in place (as
Dv remains constant). All equilibrium variables in the next proofs (such as effort e, tightness q, or
employment n) are implicit functions of (a;t).
41LEMMA A5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if v(c) = ln(c), we have the following comparative
statics for equilibrium variables:
¶q
¶a










   
t
> 0:
Proof. We know that ¶e=¶q > 0; ¶n=¶q > 0; ¶n=¶e > 0. We also know that under Assump-
tions 1 and 2, ¶nd=¶q < 0; ¶nd=¶a > 0. We differentiate equilibrium condition (4) with respect to



























































So ¶q=¶a>0. We conclude using e(a;t)=e(q(a;t);Dv(t)) and n(a;t)=n(e(a;t);q(a;t)).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Under Assumption 2 we can apply Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 1, Proposition 2
implies that em=eM = 1+scq(q)na 1, where s > 0 and c > 0 are constant. Under Assump-
tions 2 and 1, Lemma A5 implies that ¶q=¶ajt > 0 and ¶n=¶ajt > 0. Since q0(q) < 0 and a  1,
we infer that ¶

em=eM
=¶ajt < 0, which is the ﬁrst result in the proposition.
We focus on the second result in the proposition: the cyclicality of eM. First, we express em as a
function of the the elasticity eDv
Dc  (Dc=Dv)(¶Dv=¶Dc). The worker’s supply of effort es(q;Dc;a)


























where we used the Deﬁnition 1 of em, Lemma A2, and Assumption 4. Next, we derive an expres-
42sion for eDv







































































































Under Assumption 3 the elasticity k is constant. According to Lemma A5, valid under Assump-
tions 1 and 3, ¶n=¶ajt > 0. We showed that ¶

em=eM
=¶ajt < 0. We conclude that ¶eM=¶ajt > 0
because, keeping t ﬁxed, the ﬁrst factor increases with n and therefore with a, and the second
factor decreases with em=eM and therefore increases with a.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof requires using elasticities of unemployment “in utility” instead of the elasticities of




























We re-derive our optimal UI formula (9) using the elasticities em
v ;eM
v .








































43First step. The government chooses Dv to maximize v(cu)+nDv uk(e). Using the envelope
































































































































































































































Note that cu=Dc = t=(1 t) since t = cu=ce. Thus we obtain the exact optimal UI formula in
sufﬁcient statistics (A9).


























v as a function of equilibrium variables.






 1 = Z0(t)n W > 0; (A11)











Proof. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 we can use the result from Proposition 2, which remains valid















Using the results from Lemma A1 and Lemma A2 under Assumption 4,
¶n
¶q


























































































where W > 0 is constant under Assumption 3. Solving the differential equation yields (A11).









Proof. The deﬁnition (A7) of em



























We conclude by using the property that under Assumption 4, h = sn.























































Furthermore, we deﬁne Q(t;a)  G(n(t;a);t). We rewrite the optimal UI formula as F(t) =
Q(t;a). We assume that for any a > 0, F(t) and Q(t;a) cross only once at t(a) 2 (0;1). The
implicit function t(a) characterizes the optimal replacement rate for technology a.
LEMMA A9. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, lima!0n(a;t(a)) = 0 and lima!0t(a) = 0.
Proof. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (11) implies that for
any a > 0, an(a;t(a))a 1  wag 1 and 0  n(a;t(a))  N(a) 

(a=w)a1 g1=(1 a). Since
g < 1 and 0 < a < 1, lima!0N(a) = 0. The squeeze theorem implies that lima!0n(a;t(a)) = 0.































We showed that lima!0n(a;t(a)) = 0. So there exists a0 > 0 such that for all a < a0, n(a;t(a)) <
1=2. For any a > 0, 0  n(a;t(a))  N(a). Thus for any a < a0,










Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the limit of the right-hand-side term when a ! 0 is 0 because
46lima!0N(a) = 0. Using the squeeze theorem, we infer that lima!0F(t(a)) = 0. We conclude
that lima!0t(a) = 0 using the continuity of F() on (0;1).
Lemma A9 establishes that when employment converges to 0 because technology decreases to
0, then the optimal replacement rate converges to 0. This result implies that for very low levels of
technology, and very low levels of employment, the optimal replacement rate is bound to increase
with technology.
LEMMA A10. If n > 1=2 and W  1 then ¶G=¶n < 0.




Ifn>1=2, theﬁrstterm(2n 1)(1 t)>0sincet<1. IfW1, thesecondtermisnonnegative.
To see this, note that (1 S)n < 1 and rewrite the second term as
Z(n;t)[(W 1)[tS+(1 t)f1 (1 S)ng]+(1 S)(1 t)n]  0:
If W 2 [0;1), the second term may be negative.
At technology a, the optimal replacement rate t(a) satisﬁes F(t(a)) = Q(t(a);a). We consider
amarginalchangeintechnologyfromatoa >a. UsingLemmaA5underAssumption3, weknow
that n(t(a);a) > n(t(a);a). Using Lemma A10 for n > 1=2 and t 2 (0;1), G(n(t(a);a);t(a)) <
G(n(t(a);a);t(a)) such that Q(t(a);a) < Q(t(a);a) = F(t(a)). Since F(t) and Q(t;a) cross
only once for t 2 (0;1), limt!0F(t) = 0, and limt!0Q(t;a) > 0, it must be that F(t) crosses
Q(t;a) “from below”. Thus is must be that t(a) > t(a) and dt=da < 0.
B Extensions of the Optimal UI Formula
In this section, we derive the results presented in Section 2.3, in which we describe extensions of
our optimal UI formula to various settings. We also present some additional results, especially
approximations of the optimal UI formulas.
B.1 Self-insurance
Unemployed workers choose effort e and home production y to maximize
[1 e f(q)][v(cu+y) m(y)]+[e f(q)]v(ce) k(e)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to home production y yields
m0(y) = v0(cu+y); (A15)
47which implicitly deﬁnes optimal home production y(cu). The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
search effort e yields k0(e) = f(q)Dvh, where we denote Dvh = v(ce) [v(cu+y(cu)) m(y(cu))]
the utility difference between being employed and unemployed. The condition implicitly deﬁnes
optimal effort e(q;Dvh).
The government chooses Dc to maximize expected utility
n(e;q)v(cu+Dc)+[1 n(e;q)][v(cu+y) m(y)] uk(e)
Using the envelope theorem, as workers choose search effort e and home production y to maximize















As in the case without self-insurance, we derive the optimal UI formula in three steps. The ﬁrst

































B.2 Wage response to UI
Optimal UI formula. In equilibrium, the wage paid by ﬁrms responds to Dc: w = w(Dc). It is
likely that w0(Dc) < 0: for instance with bargaining, higher Dc lowers the outside option of work-
ers and reduces wages. If UI inﬂuences wages, labor demand is a function of UI: nd = nd(q;Dc),
which reﬂects the inﬂuence of UI on ﬁrm’s recruiting decision through wages. Labor market tight-
ness q(Dc) is now characterized by the equilibrium condition nd(q;Dc) = ns(q;Dc). The macro-
elasticity captures the inﬂuence of UI on employment and labor market tightness through all chan-
nels, including possibly wages.
We amend the budget constraint of the government because the wage w(Dc) is now a func-
tion of Dc. We modify the second and third steps in the proof of Proposition 1 accordingly. We




























































































A special form of incidence. The core of the analysis uses the standard assumption that the
incidence of the labor tax falls fully on workers. In this section, we consider the nonstandard
assumption that the tax burden w ce = t w—the wedge between wages paid by ﬁrms and post-
tax earnings received by workers, is shared between ﬁrms and workers. We assume that ﬁrms cover
a constant fraction of the burden:
w = w+yt w
ce = w (1 y)t w;
where y and w are parameters. Using the budget constraint nt w = (1 n)bw, we express w





















































































































































































































The structure of our optimal UI formula remains the same. We only adjust each of the three terms
with functions of the incidence parameter y. The formula gives optimal UI taking into account
the insurance value of unemployment beneﬁts, the moral-hazard cost of UI, and the employment
cost of ﬁnancing beneﬁts by taxing ﬁrms more. In addition to reducing jobseekers’ effort, UI
also reduces ﬁrms’ hiring by increasing the marginal cost of labor through higher wages. The
effect on labor demand arises because of the assumption on tax incidence. The effect does not
appear directly in the formula but appears indirectly through the macro-elasticity eM. In recessions,
they are two competing effects: a lower cost of UI because of lower labor supply (through the
reduction in search effort caused by higher UI), which lowers eM, and a higher cost of UI because
of lower labor demand (through the increase in labor tax imposed on ﬁrms), which raises eM. Only
simulations can guide the design of UI in that case.
50C The Canonical Equilibrium Unemployment Model
This section studies the canonical model of Pissarides [2000], characterized by Assumptions 5





C.1 The Nash bargaining solution
We determine the outcome of the bargaining problem faced by a ﬁrm-worker pair. E denotes the
value of being employed, and U the value of being unemployed. Both values are evaluated after
the matching process. They satisfy
E = v((1 t)w)
U = v(bw):
Combining both conditions yields the worker’s surplus W from a relationship with a ﬁrm.
W =E  U = [v((1 t)w) v(bw)]: (A17)
When worker and ﬁrm bargain, they take the tax rate t and unemployment beneﬁts bw as given.
In the term bw of W, w is the equilibrium wage that is taken as given by worker and ﬁrm. In
the term (1 t)w of W, w is the outcome of the wage bargaining between the ﬁrm and the
worker. Therefore when the worker evaluates the marginal utility dW of an increase dw in the




= (1 t)v0((1 t)w) = (1 t)1 rv0(w):
In equilibrium the ﬁrm’s surplus from an established relationship is simply given by the hiring
cost since a ﬁrm can immediately replace a worker at that cost during the matching period: F =
ra=q(q). Since the ﬁrm’s utility is simply its proﬁts, a wage w brings a utility  w to the ﬁrm (or
its owners) and dF =dw =  1.
The generalized Nash solution to the bargaining problem faced by a ﬁrm-worker pair is the
wage w that maximizes
W(w)bF (w)1 b;
where b is the worker’s bargaining power. The ﬁrst-order condition of the maximization problem







Substituting the relationship into equation (A17) for the worker’s surplus W, and using the ex-
pressions for F and dW=dw, we obtain the relationship between equilibrium variables imposed









































Absence of ﬂuctuations with Nash bargaining. Combining the expression for w=a with the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (11) yields an expression for tightness q as a function of the
parametersofthemodelonly. Keepingtconstanttherearenoﬂuctuationsinlabormarkettightness













C.2 An optimal UI formula
This section derives an optimal UI formula in a class of models in which wages may respond to UI,
and the production function satisﬁes Assumption 5. By choosing Dc the government maximizes
nv(ce)+(1 n)v(cu) uk(e)+zp:
z is the social welfare weight placed by the government on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts p. z is taken as
given by the government. Combining the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition, the government’s





We also assume that the wage w(Dc) may respond to Dc.




















where we deﬁne v0  [nv0(ce)+(1 n)v0(cu)].




























































Third step. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (11) allows us to link wage to labor market
tightness q: w = a ra=q(q). In turn, the condition allows us to express wage changes imposed

































where we used once more the result from Lemma 1 to express dq=dDc.




































We set z = v0 (the welfare weight is arbitrary). Since h = n (1 u), dividing the equation by




































The formula naturally applies to the canonical model of Pissarides [2000].
53C.3 Elasticity wedge
This section derives the pendant of Proposition 2 for the canonical model. Proposition A1 estab-
lishes that in the canonical model, under log utility, the macro-elasticity eM is greater than the
micro-elasticity em:
PROPOSITION A1. Under Assumptions 5 and 6, and if r = 1, then em=eM < 1.
Proof. Theequilibriumcondition(A19), obtainedunderAssumptions5and6, impliesthatdq=dt<
0. If r = 1, v(c) = ln(c), Dv =  ln(t), and dq=dDv > 0. Lemma 1 is also valid if (a) we replace
the elasticities “in consumption” em and eM deﬁned by Deﬁnition 1 with the elasticities “in utility”
em
v and eM
v deﬁned by Deﬁnition A1, and (b) we replace the derivative dq=dDc by dq=Dv. Since
dq=dDv > 0, Lemma 1 implies that eM
v > em




v <1. Comparing Deﬁnition 1 for em and eM with Deﬁnition A1 for em
v and eM
v it is clear
that em
v =eM
v = em=eM. Thus em=eM < 1.
C.4 Deriving an Hosios [1990] condition
If workers are risk neutral, the social planner does not care about ce and cu independently but cares
about aggregate consumption c  nce +(1 n)cu. Given initial unemployment u the planner
chooses consumption, effort, labor market tightness, and number of hires fc;e;q;hg to maximize
social welfare c uk(e), subject to the matching process
h = e f(q)u (A21)














where A; B are Lagrange multipliers. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to c;e;q;h are
1 = B




























Therefore, optimal effort, hiring, tightness, and consumption fe;h;q;cg are completely described



















We compare the conditions with equilibrium conditions (2) and (11) for the canonical model.
Assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function, such that h is a constant, and risk-neutral workers.
The equilibrium wage is the Nash bargained wage (A18). To replicate the efﬁcient allocation in
the canonical model, it sufﬁces that b = h and t = 0, which is the Hosios [1990] condition.
D Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Wage Subsidies
We start by describing the labor market equilibrium under technology a, when the replacement rate
is t = ce=cu and the normalized wage is ˜ w = w=a.
Under Assumption 3, v(c) = ln(c). Equation (2) implicitly deﬁnes a function e(q;t), which
gives the optimal search effort for tightness q and replacement rate t. The law of motion of em-
ployment n(e;q) is deﬁned by (1). We deﬁne the labor supply by ns(q;t)  n(e(q;t);q). The
ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (11) can be rewritten as




which implicitly deﬁnes a labor demand nd(q; ˜ w) under Assumption 1. The equilibrium condi-
tion (4) can be rewritten as
ns(q;t) = nd(q; ˜ w);
which implicitly deﬁnes equilibrium labor market tightness q(t; ˜ w). Furthermore, we deﬁne equi-
libriumemploymentn(t; ˜ w)ns(q(t; ˜ w);t)andequilibriumefforte(t; ˜ w)e(q(t; ˜ w);t). LemmaA11
establishes how equilibrium variables respond to a change in the wage ˜ w:
LEMMA A11. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if v(c) = ln(c), we have the following comparative



















Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma A5.
55The government chooses a rate b of unemployment beneﬁts, a tax rate t imposed on the salary
w received by employees, and a subsidy rate s imposed on the salary w paid by employers.
Effectively, ﬁrms pay a wage w = (1 s)w, employed workers consume ce = (1 t)w, and
unemployed workers consume cu = bw. The government is subject to the budget constraint
(1 n)bw+nsw =t nw
(1 n)bw+nw nt w = nw nsw
(1 n)cu+nce = nw:
The budget constraint remains the same as in the baseline model even though the labor tax is
collected from workers and partly redistributed to ﬁrms as a wage subsidy. The budget constraint
deﬁnes a function that gives the consumption of employed workers in equilibrium: ce(t; ˜ w;a) 
a ˜ ce(t; ˜ w) where




In equilibrium, the expected utility of a worker is
ln(ce(t; ˜ w;a))+[1 n(t; ˜ w)]ln(t) uk(e(t; ˜ w)) = ln(a)+SW (t; ˜ w);
where we deﬁne the function
SW (t; ˜ w)  ln(˜ ce(t; ˜ w))+[1 n(t; ˜ w)]ln(t) uk(e(t; ˜ w)):
In Section 3, we maximized SW (t; ˜ w) over t2(0;1) for ˜ w= ˜ w(a)wag 1 (because we made
Assumption 2). The result from Proposition 4 in Section 3 tell us something about the properties




Furthermore, we deﬁne the replacement rate t(a)  t( ˜ w(a)). Under some conditions, Proposi-










we infer that dt=d ˜ w > 0 (under the assumptions of Proposition 4).
Let us consider the problem of the government when the government chooses optimally both the
wage ˜ w and the replacement rate t. To capture the various costs of implementing a wage subsidy
discussed in Section 3.5, we assume that setting a wage ˜ w when the technology is a imposes a
welfare cost C ( ˜ w;a) > 0. If the salary is a function w(a) of a, a possible welfare cost could be an
increasing convex functionC(s) of the subsidy rate s. The reason is that s=[w w(a)]=w(a)=
[a ˜ w w(a)]=w(a) so s is only a function of ˜ w and a. A critical assumption is that the welfare
56cost C does not depend on the replacement rate t. The government chooses jointly t and ˜ w to
maximize
ln(a)+SW (t; ˜ w) C ( ˜ w;a):
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to t is
¶SW(t; ˜ w)
¶t
   
˜ w= ˜ w†
= 0
where ˜ w† is the optimal wage. Therefore the optimal replacement rate is t† = t( ˜ w†), where t()
is the function deﬁned above. Our study of the government problem in Section 3 tell us that t( ˜ w)
has the property that dt=d ˜ w > 0.
Note that the the optimal wage ˜ w†(a) is deﬁned implicitly by the ﬁrst-order condition
¶SW(t; ˜ w)
¶ ˜ w





   
a
= 0:
Assume that the replacement rate t† is ﬁxed. There is a technology shock from a to a0 such that
employment decreases after the optimal wage is adjusted from ˜ w†(a) to ˜ w†(a0). Lemma A11
implies that ˜ w†(a) < ˜ w†(a0). Since the optimal replacement rate is solely a function of the optimal
wage: t† = t( ˜ w†) with dt=d ˜ w > 0, t† must increase. Therefore after an adverse shock that
increases unemployment, the optimal replacement rate increases. The substantive conclusion of
Proposition 4 is robust to the presence of wage subsidies: optimal UI is more generous when
unemployment is high.
E The Dynamic Model
This section describes in detail and studies the dynamic model of Section 4. We assume that the
disutility of effort is isoelastic: k(e) = wke1+k=(1+k); the disutility of home production is isoe-
lastic: m(y) = wmy1+µ=(1+µ); ﬁrm’s production function satisﬁes Assumption 1; and the wage
satisﬁes Assumption 2. To simplify notations, we denote by ch
t  cu
t +yt the total consumption




t ) m(yt)] the utility gain from work. We denote unemployment
ut = 1 (1 s)nt 1 and number of hires ht = nt  (1 s)nt 1.
We assume that technology follows a stochastic process fatg
+¥
t=0. Together with initial employ-
ment n 1 in the representative ﬁrm, the history of technology realizations at (a0;a1;:::;at) fully
describes the state of the economy in period t. The time-t element of the worker’s choice, ﬁrm’s
choice, and government policy must be measurable with respect to (at;n 1).
57E.1 Equilibrium
Government’s budget. The government fully taxes proﬁts, taxes or subsidizes labor income,









[nt  (1 s)nt 1] = nt ce
t +(1 nt)cu
t : (A23)
Firm’s problem. Given labor market tightness and technology fqt;atg
+¥

























The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to nd
t implies
at g0(nd













t=0 and labor market tightness fqtg
+¥
t=0 the
representative worker chooses job-search effort and home production fet;ytg
+¥




























et  f(qt): (A26)





























t=0 is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers. The ﬁrst-order condition with re-
spect to home production yt is
m0(yt) = v0(ch
t ): (A27)
58The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to effort et is
k0(et) = f(qt)At:
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to employment probability ns
t is
At = Dvh
t +d(1 s)Et [k(et+1)]+d(1 s)Et [At+1(1 et+1 f(qt+1))]:










Labor market equilibrium. Wages follow an exogenous stochastic process and cannot equalize
labor supply and demand. As in Hall [2005], we only require that wages should neither interfere
with the formation of an employment match that generates a positive bilateral surplus, nor cause
the destruction of such a match. Since wages cannot equalize labor supply and labor demand, labor
market tightness fqtg
+¥














t  nt: (A29)
Equilibrium deﬁnition. An equilibrium with unemployment insurance is a collection of stochas-
tic processes fce
t, cu
t ,yt; et, nt, qtg+¥
t=0 that satisfy equations (A23), (A24), (A26), (A27), and (A28).
The unemployment insurance program is fully contingent on the history of realizations of shocks,
and is taken as given by ﬁrms and workers. We assume that the government can fully commit to the





social welfare (A25) over all equilibria with unemployment insurance. An optimal equilibrium is
an equilibrium with unemployment insurance that attains the maximum of (A25).
59E.2 Optimal equilibrium
Government’s problem. The maximization of the government is over a collection of sequences
fce
t(at), cu
t (at), yt(at), et(at), nt(at), qt(at); 8atg+¥





























































t=0 are sequences of Lagrange multipliers. We






















m00() > 0 and v00() < 0:
0 = Qt: (A30)
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ce









Using (A30) the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to cu
t (at) for t  0 are












60The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to et(at) for t  0 are






 k(1 s)Bt 1k0(et)+Dt ut  f(qt)
















The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to qt(at) for t  0 are









































 rat [Ct  (1 s)Ct 1+At ht]: (A34)







+d(1 s)Et [k(et+1)] Dt +(1 s)Et [Dt+1(1 et+1 f(qt+1)]





















+d(1 s)Et [k(et+1)]+(1 s)Et [Dt+1(1 et+1 f(qt+1)]





















+d(1 s)Et [k(et+1)]+(1 s)Et [Dt+1(1 et+1 f(qt+1)]









where we used the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (A24).
Equilibrium characterization. The optimal equilibrium is a collection of 11 stochastic pro-
cesses fce
t, cu
t ,yt; et, nt, qt;At;Bt;Ct;Dt;Qtg+¥
t=0 that satisfy 11 equations f(A23), (A24), (A26),
(A27), (A28), (A30), (A31), (A32), (A33), (A34), (A35)g.
61Steady state. In steady state there are no aggregate shocks: at = a for all t. The optimal equilib-
rium is constant, and is characterized by a collection of 11 variables fce;cu;y;n;q;e;A;B;C;D;Qg
characterized by 11 equations f(A23), (A24), (A26), (A27), (A28), (A30), (A31), (A32), (A33),
(A34), (A35)g. It is useful to combine together a few of the ﬁrst-order conditions and constraints
of the government’s problem to re-express some Lagrange multipliers in a simpler form. These
relationships are useful to solve steady-state optimal equilibria numerically. Combining (A31)
















































































are characterized by the system of 11 equations f(A23), (A24), (A26),
(A27), (A28), (A30), (A31), (A32), (A33), (A34), (A35)g for technology a = a = 1.
To simplify notations, we denote h = sn, u = 1 (1 s)n, ch = cu +y, and Dv
h = v(ce) 
v(ch)+m(y). By deﬁnition the log-deviations
n
ˇ ut;ˇ ht; ˇ ch




satisfy: (1 s) ˇ nt 1+sˇ ht  ˇ nt =0;
ˇ ut+o1 ˇ nt 1 =0 where o1 =(1 u)=u; m0 ˇ yt+m1 ˇ cu
t   ˇ ch
t =0, where m0 =y=ch and m1 =1 m0;
and s1 ee  ˇ ce
t +s2 eh  ˇ ch
t +s3 (1+µ) ˇ yt   ˇ Dv
h
t = 0 where s1 = v(ce)=Dv
h, s2 =  v(ch)=Dv
h,
s3 = 1 s1 s2, and ei = dln(v(x))=dln(x)jx=ci is the elasticity of the utility function at ci.
The logarithmic deviations of the 6 variables

ˇ ce; ˇ cu; ˇ y; ˇ n; ˇ q; ˇ e
	
and 5 Lagrange multipliers  ˇ A; ˇ B; ˇ Q; ˇ C; ˇ D
	
describing the optimal equilibrium are characterized by the following system of
6211 log-linear equations. The budget constraint (A23) is
ˇ at +a ˇ nt  q0
ˇ ht +h ˇ qt + ˇ at

 q1[p1( ˇ nt + ˇ ce
t)+ p2( p3 ˇ nt + ˇ cu
t )] = 0;



















 t1(1+k)Et [ˇ et+1]+ ˇ Dv
h
t = 0;
where t1 = kd(1 s)k(e)=Dv
h and t2 = 1 t1. Worker’s optimal home production (A27) is
µ ˇ yt +r ˇ ch
t = 0:
Firm’s optimal hiring (A24) is
 ˇ at +(1 a) ˇ nt +r1g ˇ at +r2
 




h ˇ qt+1+ ˇ at+1

= 0;










, and r3 = 1 r1  r2. The law of motion of
employment (A26) is
ˇ ut + ˇ et +(1 h) ˇ qt   ˇ ht = 0:
Equation (A30) imposes ˇ Qt = 0. Multipliers At and Bt satisfy (A31) and (A32):
ˇ At +r ˇ ce
t +u1
 
ˇ nt   ˇ Bt

= 0
ˇ At +r ˇ ch
t +u2
 
u3 ˇ nt + ˇ Bt

= 0;








, and u3 = n=(1 n). Multiplier Dt satisﬁes (A33):
ˇ Dt + ˇ ht +(1+k) ˇ et  w2 ˇ ut  w3 ˇ Bt 1 w4















=[(1+k)k(e)], and w2 = u=w1, w3 = k(1 s)B=w1, w4 = 1 w2  w3.
MultiplierCt satisﬁes (A34):
ˇ ht  h ˇ qt + ˇ Dt  x8
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where x1 = hq(q)D(1 h)=h, x8 = rhA=x1, x7 = rsC=x1, and x6 = 1 x7 x8. The last









ˇ et+1+(1 h) ˇ qt+1

+y4
 ˇ Ct + ˇ at +(a 2) ˇ nt

+y5
 ˇ At +(z1g ˇ at +z2 ˇ ce




 ˇ At+1  ˇ At

= 0;
where y1 = Dv




, y4 =  a(1 a)na 2
C=D, y5 =1 y1 y2 y3 y4, z1 =w=[w (ce cu)], z2 = ce=[w (ce cu)], z3 =1 z2 z3,













In addition we assume that the log-deviation of technology ˇ at follows an AR(1) process: ˇ at =
n ˇ at 1 +zt, where zt  N(0;s2) is the innovation to technology driving ﬂuctuations in the log-
linear model. We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution to the log-linear
system using the standard method.28 The solution allows us to compute the IRFs of variables to
unexpected technology shocks, as in Figure 3.
E.4 Calibration
This section derives the relationships between the convexity µ and k of the disutility from home
production and from job search, and statistics estimated in the literature.The relationships are used
to calibrate the dynamic model of Section 4.
Disutility from home production. We estimate the convexity µ of the disutility m(y) = wm 
y1+µ=(1+µ) of home production y. The ratio x  ch=ce = (cu+y)=ce captures the consumption
dropuponunemployment. Consideraworkerwhoreceivesamarginaldecreasedcu <0inbeneﬁts,
which decreases his total consumption by dch = dcu+dy < 0. The marginal consumption drop is
e2  dch=dcu. We relate the statistics e2 and x to µ. Then we use empirical estimates of e2 and x

























28See Anderson, Gary and George Moore, “A Linear Algebraic Procedure for Solving Linear Perfect Foresight
Models,” Economics Letters, 1985, 17(3), 247–252.











Disutility from job search. We estimate the convexity k of the disutility k(e)=wke1+k=(1+k)
from search. Let x  e f(q) be the hazard rate out of unemployment. Assume that the worker
receives an increase dcu > 0 in beneﬁts, reduces home production by dy < 0, and reduces search
effort by de < 0, which leads to a reduction dx = f(q)de < 0 in the hazard rate (we consider a
change in beneﬁts for one worker only, so labor market tightness q is not affected by the policy
experiment). The reduction in hazard rate is captured by the elasticity e1  (cu=x)(dx=dcu). We
ﬁrst show how e1 relates to k. Then we use empirical estimates of e1 to calibrate k.
LEMMAA12. Lete(q;Dvh)betheeffortsupplyimplicitlydeﬁnedbytheworker’sutility-maximization




+kd(1 s)k(e) = Dvh: (A36)






























































65Assuming that d  1, we differentiate the optimality condition (A36) with respect to Dvh keeping
q ﬁxed. The log-deviations of e and Dvh satisfy
ˇ Dvh = k ˇ e
sk0(e)=f(q)
Dvh +(1+k) ˇ e
k(1 s)k(e)
Dvh


















Let ˆ u be steady-state unemployment. Using Lemma A12,
¶ln(x)
¶ln(Dvh)














Since ce is ﬁxed and the provision of home production is optimal,
dDvh =  v0(ch)[dcu+dy]+m0(y)dy =  v0(ch)dcu:
In addition, if the second and higher order terms of v() are small,
Dvh  v0(ch)(ce ch)+m(y):




























































In this section, we assume that the government has access to a complete market for Arrow-Debreu
securities, instead of being constrained to balance its budget each period. In the government’s
problem, we remove the period-by-period budget constraint (13) for each at and each t and replace
it by a unique intertemporal budget constraint (14).
In the characterization of the optimal equilibrium, we replace the sequence of Lagrange multi-
pliers fAt(at); 8atg
+¥
t=0 that we placed on the period-by-period budget constraint (13) by a unique
Lagrange multiplier A placed on the unique intertemporal budget constraint (14). The Lagrangian
of the government’s problem remains exactly the same, except that the multipliers At on the period-
by-period budget constraint are replaced by the multiplier A, constant over time t and across histo-
ries at. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the government’s problem simplify accordingly. In particular
the steady state of the model, in which the government faces the unique budget constraint (14),
is the same as the steady state of the baseline dynamic model, in which the government faces a
sequence of budget constraints (13). We also obtain the log-linear system describing the optimal
equilibrium by replacing ˇ At by ˇ A = 0 in the log-linear system of the baseline model.
To be able to simulate the log-linear model and obtain the IRFs in Figure 3 , however, we need
to determine the Lagrange multiplier A on the intertemporal budget constraint. A is determined
such that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (14) be binding. We deﬁne the deﬁcit
in period t by
L(St) = nt ce
t +(1 nt)cu
t  nt w(at):








dt E0[L(St)] = 0: (A38)




































+L1 ˇ at +L2 ˇ nt +L3 ˇ ce






+L1E0[ˇ at]+L2E0[ˇ nt]+L3E0[ˇ ce
t]+L4E0[ˇ cu
t ];
where L1;L2;L3;L4 are constant. Using (A38), we infer that the intertemporal budget con-









We compute the unique stationary rational expectations solution to the log-linear system using
the standard method. Let Xt 2 Rk be the vector of log-deviations: Xt = [ˇ at; ˇ nt; ˇ ce
t; ˇ cu
t ;:::]0. Let
Zt+1 2Rk be a vector of innovations at timet+1. In our system there is only one exogenous shock,
sothereisonlyonenon-zeroentryinthevectorZt+1: Zt+1 =[0;0;:::;zt+1]0 wherezt+1 N(0;s2).
The solution to the log-linear system satisﬁes
Xt+1 = M1Xt +M2Zt+1;
where M1 2 Rkk;M2 2 Rkk are matrices that are constant over time. Taking expectations, and
using the fact that Xt is stationary: for all t  0,
E0[Xt] = E0[Xt+1] = M1E0[Xt]+M2E0[Zt+1] = M1E0[Xt]:
Since all the eigenvalues from M1 have an absolute value strictly less than one, we infer that for all
t  0, E0[Xt] = 0. Hence the log-linear system is such that
E0[ˇ nt] = E0[ˇ at] = E0[ˇ ce
t] = E0[ˇ cu
t ] = 0:
We conclude that the intertemporal budget constraint is satisﬁed by the solution to the log-linear




= 0. Therefore the
Lagrange multiplier A is simply obtained by solving the steady state of the model, which is the
same as that of the baseline model with budget balance each period.
E.6 Duration of unemployment beneﬁts
This section describes and studies a dynamic model in which unemployment beneﬁts have ﬁnite
duration, as in Fredriksson and Holmlund [2001]. We introduce three superscripts: e for Employed
workers; u for unemployed workers eligible to receive Unemployment beneﬁts; a for unemployed
workers whose unemployment beneﬁts expired, and who only receive social Assistance. The con-
sumptions of market good for each type of worker are ce
t, cu
t , and ca
t . The consumptions of home
good for unemployed workers are yu
t and ya
t . The search efforts of unemployed workers are eu
t and
ea
























t ineligible jobseekers exerting effort ea









t is aggregate search effort and ot is vacancy. We deﬁne labor




t ). After matching, zu
t eligible workers and za
t ineligible
workers are unemployed. At the end of periodt, a fraction lt of the zu
t eligible unemployed workers
















Government’s budget. The government must balance its budget each period, so it chooses the
arrival rate of ineligibility fltg
+¥

















Firm’s problem. The ﬁrm’s problem is as in the baseline model. Optimal hiring satisﬁes (A24).





t=0 and tightness fqtg
+¥
t=0 the rep-




















































We form the Lagrangian of the worker’s problem with multipliers At;Bt;Ct;Dt assigned to the









t ) = v0(ca
t +ya
t ): (A47)




t ) = f(qt)At
k0(ea
t ) = f(qt)Bt:














t +(1 s)dEt [Ct+1]+lt dEt [Dt+1 Ct+1]
Bt = Dv
a;e
t +(1 s)dEt [Dt+1]+sdEt [Dt+1 Ct+1]:















where Dkt = k(ea
t ) k(eu
t ) and Dk0
t = k0(ea
t ) k0(eu











































Labor market equilibrium. As in the baseline model, tightness fqtg
+¥




t=0 to labor supply fns
tg
+¥
t=0 such that (A29) holds, deﬁning employment fntg
+¥
t=0.








t , nt, qtg+¥
t=0 thatsatisfyequations(A39), (A40), (A41), (A42),
(A43), (A24), (A45), (A46), (A47), (A49),and (A48).
Steady state. In steady state there are no aggregate shocks: at =a for allt. The stocks of workers
are constant over time. We can recombine the laws of motion of employment and unemployment
probabilities to express fzu;xu;za;xa;ng as a function of fl;q;ea;eug. These steady-state relation-
ships are useful to solve steady-state equilibria numerically.
In steady state the outﬂows into and outﬂows from social assistance are equal.





70The outﬂows from and inﬂows into employment are equal.












































































































Optimal equilibrium. We assume that the generosity of the system of transfers is constant:
there exists tu;e;ta;e such that for all t, tu;e = cu
t =ce
t; ta;e = ca
t =ce
t. The government’s problem is
to choose a government policy flt;ce
tg
+¥
t=0 to maximize social welfare (A44) over all equilibria
with unemployment insurance. An optimal equilibrium is an equilibrium with unemployment
insurance that attains the maximum of (A44). To determine numerically the optimal arrival rate
l(a) in a steady state with technology a, we perform a grid search over a large range of arrival
rates flig (once we have picked l, consumption ce is given by the resource constraint (A43)). We
pick the arrival rate li such that the associated steady state maximizes social welfare. We repeat




to plot the graphs in Figure 4.
F Alternative Models of Recessions
71F.1 Aggregate demand shock
ThissectioncharacterizesoptimalUIinamodelinwhichrecessionsarecausedbythecombination
of low aggregate demand and nominal wage rigidity. After a negative demand shock, prices fall.
Nominal wage rigidity, combined with a lower price level, leads to a higher real wage and a higher
marginal cost of labor, which leads to lower hiring and higher unemployment.29





where p is the aggregate price level and µ is a parameter. The rule says that the real wage w is
constant in nominal terms: w p = µ.
Firm’s problem. The production function is linear in employment: g(n) = n. Productivity is
constant: workers always produce one unit of good. The ﬁrm starts with 1 u workers, and










where w is the real wage—taken as given by the ﬁrm.
Money. Because of nominal wage rigidity, it is necessary to deﬁne the price-setting mechanism.
The ﬁrm’s production is sold in a perfectly competitive goods market. The ﬁrm takes the market
price p as given. The aggregate demand curve on the goods market takes the simple form m=p,
borrowed from the quantity theory of money. Aggregate demand m proxies for the position of
the economy in the business cycle. The ﬁrm’s production at a given price p determines aggregate
supply of goods. When the labor market is in equilibrium the amount of goods produced is n.




Equilibrium. Given the aggregate price level determined by (A52) the equilibrium real wage is





29The model loosely captures one story of the Great Depression: contractionary monetary policy lead to deﬂation,


































Labor supply (high UI)



































Labor supply (high UI)
Labor supply (low UI)
Labor demand (recession)
Figure A1: Labor market equilibrium in presence of demand shocks
When aggregate demand m falls, the real wage w tends to rise. Inserting the equilibrium real wage











The labor supply ns(q;Dc) retains the same structure as in the model with technology shocks.
Equating labor demand with labor supply curve deﬁnes implicitly equilibrium labor market tight-
ness q(m;Dc) and employment n(m;Dc) as a function of aggregate demand m and consumption
gain from work Dc. The labor market equilibrium, depicted in Figure A1, shares the same struc-
ture as the equilibrium in the text.
Jobs are also rationed in recessions. Higher employment implies more production, lower prices
in the goods market, higher real wages because of nominal wage rigidity, and requires a lower
tightness for ﬁrms to be willing to hire: the aggregate labor demand curve is downward sloping in
a price q-quantity n plan. If demand is low enough (m < µ), the labor demand falls below zero for
n < 1: jobs are rationed.















   
t
> 0:
The result corresponds to Lemma A5. The proof is identical to that of Lemma A5 because, even
if the labor demand is different in the model with demand shocks, it remains true that ¶nd=¶q <
0; ¶nd=¶m > 0.
73Optimal UI formula. In the model, real wages respond to UI because UI affects equilibrium
tightness, equilibrium employment, equilibrium price level, and eventually equilibrium real wage
because the nominal wage is rigid. In the optimal UI formula, we must account for the impact of
UI on the government’s budget through wages. For instance if higher UI implies higher wages,
then higher UI has an additional beneﬁcial effect because it increases the tax base. Of course the
wage increase is partly at the cost of ﬁrm’s proﬁts. Thus we account for ﬂuctuations in proﬁts for
consistency. The appropriate optimal UI formula in this framework is given by (A20). As in the






























The government’s budget constraint combined with (A51) imposes




































Elasticities. We now study the elasticities em and eM in the model with demand shocks. We ﬁrst
















Using Lemma 1, which remains valid because the structure of labor supply has not changed, and




































































There is a positive wedge em > eM between micro- and macro-elasticity, as in the model with




=¶mjt < 0. The result corresponds to Part 1 of Proposition 3.
To determine the cyclicality of the macro-elasticity eM, we need to derive an equation equivalent
to (A6) in presence of demand shocks ((A6) is only valid in a context in which, unlike here, real
wages do not respond to UI). We start from the budget constraint.










































































































































¶n=¶mjt > 0, ¶

em=eM



































Labor supply (not lazy, high UI)




































Labor supply (lazy, high UI)
Labor supply (lazy, low UI)
Labor demand
Figure A2: Labor market equilibrium in presence of preference shocks
tion 3.
Optimal replacement rate over the business cycle. Using optimal UI formula (A55), the fact
that ¶q(q)=¶mjt < 0, as well as our results that ¶

em=eM
=¶mjt < 0 and ¶eM=¶mjt > 0, we infer
that the optimal replacement rate t is countercyclical: dt=dm < 0. The economic mechanism is
the same as in the model with technology shocks in the text: the moral hazard cost of UI falls in
recession, while the value of UI as a correction of the rat-race externality rises; hence it is optimal
to increase the generosity of UI in recessions.
F.2 Preference shock
We assume that technology a remains constant at a = 1. Instead of technology shocks, recessions
are driven by shocks to the disutility from search.
Worker’s problem. A worker’s utility is v(c) lk(e), where l is a preference parameter that
indicates the disutility of search. Fluctuations in l drive the business cycle. Given labor market
tightness q and consumptions ce and cu, a jobseeker chooses effort e to maximize expected util-






As the disutility from effort k() is convex and the job-ﬁnding rate f() is increasing, the optimal
effort e increases with tightness q, increases with the utility gain from working Dv, and decreases
with the preference parameter l.























































Figure A3: Optimal unemployment insurance over a business cycle driven by preference shocks
Equilibrium. The labor market equilibrium is depicted in Figure A2. It shares the same structure
as the labor market equilibrium in the text. The only difference is the response of the economy
to a shock. When l increases, search becomes more costly, effort supply es(q;Dc;l) diminishes
for a given q, and the labor supply curve ns(q;Dc;l)  n(es(q;Dc;l);q) shifts left. Equilibrium
employment falls, unemployment increases, and labor market tightness increases. Periods with
higher l are “recessions” because they are periods with higher unemployment. However, these pe-
riods are unrealistic because they combine high unemployment with hight labor market tightness.
In reality tightness falls when unemployment increases.
Optimal unemployment insurance formula. Looking at the derivation of the optimal UI for-
mula in the text (proof of Proposition 1), it appears that replacing the disutility of effort k(e) by
lk(e) does not inﬂuence the optimal UI formula because the preference parameter l does not
affect the convexity k of k(e).
Elasticities. We now study the elasticities em and eM in the model with preference shocks. Our
goal is to determine whether optimal UI should be procyclical or countercyclical. Proposition 2
remains valid: under Assumptions 2, 3, and 4 the elasticity wedge is given by
em
eM = 1+cq(q)na 1;
where c = a(1 a)[(1 h)=h][(1+k)=k](s=r) is constant. In recessions, n decreases while
q increases. So q(q) decreases while na 1 increases. To determine the cyclicality of the wedge








77In recessions the wage w remains constant so that the right-hand side of the equation decreases as
q(q) decreases. Hence q(q)na 1 decreases. The elasticity wedge em=eM becomes procyclical,
whereas it was countercyclical in presence of technology shocks (Proposition 3). In general, we
cannot conclude on the cyclicality of eM given t. We conjecture that the cyclicality of the optimal
replacement rate t depends on parameter values. Therefore we resort to simulations to describe
the optimal replacement rate over the business cycle.
Simulations. The results from the simulation of the model with preference shocks are displayed
in Figure A3. All computations are based on the dynamic model calibrated in Table 1 (the calibra-
tion does not need to change even if the source of shock is different). The optimal replacement rate
is procyclical: it increases from 58% to 72% when the unemployment rate decreases from 10%
to 4%. Labor market tightness increases sharply in recessions, making this model of the business
cycle unrealistic.
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